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Introduction	
	 	
American	accounting	standards	had	long	been	considered	the	benchmark	to	
which	most	other	international	standard‐setting	bodies	compared.	This	influence	in	
the	 international	 accounting	 realm	 largely	 rested	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 United	
States	 capital	 markets,	 among	 other	 things.	 Yet,	 lately	 many	 academics,	
professionals,	 and	 auditors	 have	 voiced	 various	 concerns	 about	 US	 accounting	
standards	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 generate	 reliable	 financial	 information.	 Still,	 the	
predominant	 sentiment	 in	America	was	 to	 just	 continue	 ‘business	as	usual’.	 Faced	
with	the	challenges	of	an	ever	evolving	and	increasingly	globalized	business	world,	
US	 accounting	 standard‐setters	 considered	 the	 value	 of	 international	 standard	
adoption.	Though	 they	had	 engaged	 in	 conversations	with	 international	 standard‐
setters	 and	 initiated	 several	 joint	 ventures1,	 their	 efforts	 have	 been	 largely	
unsuccessful.	 Unbeknownst	 to	 the	 accounting	 community,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 ever	
corporate	 insolvencies	was	 looming	 on	 the	 horizon.	 Enron,	 a	 Texas‐based	 energy,	
commodities,	 and	 services	 company,	 had	 been	 named	 ‘America’s	Most	 Innovative	
Company’	 by	 Fortune	Magazine	 for	 six	 consecutive	 years	 (Q&A:	 The	 Enron	 case,	
2006).	By	late	2001,	it	was	revealed	that	Enron’s	success	had	been	largely	sustained	
by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 creative	 accounting	 techniques.	 On	 December	 2nd,	 2001,	
                                                            
1	Accounting	for	revenue	recognition	is	an	example	of	one	of	these	efforts.	In	the	United	States,	for	
example,	there	are	over	one	hundred	different	ways	to	account	for	revenue.	In	countries	abroad	that	
elect	to	use	IFRS,	the	international	set	of	standards,	revenue	recognition	is	largely	determined	by	one	
basic	standard,	IAS	18.	As	such,	the	American	and	international	standard‐setting	bodies	have	
attempted	to	work	together	towards	convergence	with	the	intention	of	increasing	global	
comparability	(Howard,	n.d.).	
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Enron	filed	for	Chapter	11	Bankruptcy	Protection	under	Title	11	of	the	United	States	
Bankruptcy	 Code	 (Oppel	 and	 Sorkin,	 2001).	 Once	 the	 dust	 had	 settled,	 questions	
immediately	began	to	surface.	People	wondered	how	Enron	had	been	able	to	exploit	
loopholes	 and	perpetuate	 this	 fraudulent	 accounting	 treatment	 for	 so	 long.	 It	was	
evident	 that	 Enron	 had	 gone	 to	 great	 lengths	 to	 conceal	 the	 truth	 regarding	 its	
earnings,	 “and	 its	 cooperative	 auditors	 failed	 to	 insist	 that	 it	 follow	 the	 rules	 on	
related	party	transactions”	(Bratton,	2003,	p.	1042).	So	were	Enron’s	opportunistic	
managers	 to	 blame?	 Or	 was	 it	 the	 company’s	 ‘independent’	 auditors,	 Arthur	
Anderson?	 Still	 many	 pointed	 to	 the	 progressively	 more	 complex	 accounting	
standards.	The	answers	to	these	questions	will	be	more	fully	explored	later,	but	one	
could	argue	that,	to	some	extent,	all	three,	the	management,	auditors,	and	standards,	
played	a	role	in	propagating	the	fraud.		
	 Enron	 and	 Arthur	 Anderson,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 accounting	 firms	 in	 the	
world2,	were	both	dissolved	within	a	matter	of	years.	Enron	ended	its	bankruptcy	in	
2004	 and	 sold	 its	 final	 remaining	 entity	 in	 September	 2006	 (The	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	
Enron:	A	brief	history,	2006).	Doomed	to	a	similar	fate,	Arthur	Anderson	voluntarily	
forfeited	its	licenses	to	practice	accountancy	in	the	United	States	in	2002	following	a	
guilty	verdict	 in	relation	to	the	firm’s	handling	of	the	Enron	audit	(Beltran,	Gering,	
and	 Martin,	 2002).	 The	 more	 long‐lasting	 impact,	 however,	 was	 the	 calling‐to‐
question	of	the	once	seemingly	infallible	US	accounting	standards.	Often	crises	can	
serve	 as	 an	 impetus	 for	 institutional	 change.	 Investors,	 both	 domestic	 and	
                                                            
2	Arthur	Anderson	was,	at	the	time,	one	of	the	‘Big	5’	accounting	firms.	The	other	four	were,	and	are	
still	to	this	day:	Deloitte	Touche	Tohmatsu,	Ernst	&	Young,	PricewaterhouseCoopers,	and	KPMG.	
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international,	began	to	lose	confidence	in	the	merit	of	US	financial	reporting.	More	
explicitly,	one	author	cites	the	American	accounting	scandals	of	2001‐2002	as	one	of	
the	 most	 essential	 drivers	 responsible	 for	 igniting	 “accounting	 standard	
harmonization3	by	breaking	a	deadlock	between	the	US	accounting	authorities	and	
the	IASB4”	(Eaton,	2005,	p.	1).		
	 Many,	at	both	the	individual	and	institutional	levels,	began	to	question	why,	
during	a	historically	deregulatory	period	in	the	United	States,	accounting	standards	
were	becoming	more	and	more	complex	(Sawabe,	2005).	Though	perhaps	an	over‐
attribution,	many	 point	 to	 the	 highly	 technical	 yet	 flawed	 accounting	 rules	 as	 the	
main	 culprit	 in	 the	Enron	 scandal.	 They	argue	 that	had	 the	 accounting	 rules	been	
better,	the	fraud	may	have	been	avoided.	Regardless	of	the	validity	of	this	argument,	
US	 standards	had	 grown	 increasingly	precise	 over	 time,	 characterized	by	detailed	
guidance	and	numerous	exemptions.	Many	felt	 that	this	precision	not	only	invited,	
but	encouraged,	opportunistic	interpretation	of	accounting	standards	by	corporate	
management	 (Agoglia,	 Doupnik,	 and	 Tsakumis,	 2011).	 More	 and	more,	 managers	
began	developing	a	‘Where	does	it	say	I	can’t	do	this?’	mentality.	Creative	managers	
gradually	 started	 to	 “exploit	 the	 gaps	 in	 GAAP5”	 (Anson,	 2002).	 That	 is,	 these	
managers	 structured	 transactions	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 they	would	 technically	be	 in	
compliance	 with	 the	 standard	 but	 would	 ultimately	 fail	 to	 communicate	 the	
                                                            
3	Accounting	standard	harmonization	refers	to	the	reduction	in	variation	between	the	different	
bodies	of	standards	used	internationally.	
4	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	(IASB):	board	responsible	for	issuing	international	
accounting	standards	in	over	115	countries,	including	all	companies	listed	in	Europe.	
5	Generally	Accepted	Accounting	Principles	
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economic	 reality,	 a	 practice	 known	 as	 regulatory	 arbitrage6.	 During	 the	 ‘Dot‐Com	
Bubble7’,	 the	 number	 of	 inappropriately	 structured	 transactions	 grew	 and	
eventually	 led	 to	 massive	 overstatements	 and	 subsequent	 restatements.	 The	
Government	 Accountability	 Office	 (GAO)8	 issued	 a	 report	 in	 October	 2002	 noting	
that	 restatements	by	public	 companies	 increased	 from	ninety‐two	 in	1997	 to	 two	
hundred	twenty‐five	in	2001.	Between	January	1997	and	June	2002,	eight	hundred	
forty‐five	 companies	 had	 announced	 restatements,	 nearly	 ten	 percent	 of	 all	 those	
publicly	 traded.	 So	 again,	 why	 this	 move	 towards	 more	 rules	 in	 accounting	
standards?	
	 This	movement	was	driven	primarily	by	two	factors:	the	United	States	legal	
environment	and	demand	from	managers	and	auditors,	a	related	but	separate	topic.	
There	seems	to	be	a	propensity	towards	rules	in	the	US	legal	system.	The	existence	
of	rules	allows	for	actors	to	hide	behind	so‐called	‘bright	lines’.	A	bright‐line	rule	is	
objective	and	clearly	defined,	allowing	 for	 little	or	no	 interpretation.	 In	 the	United	
States’	health	care	system,	for	example,	practitioners	are	forced	to	issue	numerous,	
and	often	unnecessary,	 tests	 in	order	 to	 avoid	potential	malpractice	 lawsuits.	 In	a	
similar	 vein,	 managers	 and	 auditors	 prefer	 rules	 because	 they	 can	 point	 to	
adherence	 of	 a	 certain	 rule	 in	 court	 as	 a	 means	 to	 absolve	 themselves	 of	 any	
                                                            
6	Regulatory	arbitrage:	“the	practice	of	structuring	an	inappropriate	transaction	so	it	stays	within	the	
bounds	set	by	a	rule”	(Bratton,	2003).	
7	The	Dot‐Com	Bubble	refers	to	a	period	from	approximately	1997‐2000	during	which	speculative	
investors	experienced	huge	stock	price	increases	in	the	internet	sector	before	they	peaked	in	March,	
2000,	followed	by	a	quick,	steep	decline	in	price	(Here’s	why	the	Dot	Com	bubble	began	and	why	it	
popped,	2010).	
8	The	GAO	is	“an	independent,	nonpartisan	agency	that	works	for	Congress,	supporting	them	in	
meeting	their	constitutional	responsibilities	and	ensuring	the	accountability	of	the	federal	
government”	(Herrick	and	Barrionuevo,	2002).	
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wrongdoing.	 Of	 course,	 this	 propensity	 towards	 rules	 often	 does	 not	 align	 with	
investors	 desires	 for	 timely,	 relevant,	 and	 reliable	 information,	 much	 like	
unnecessary	tests	do	not	align	with	patients	desires	for	a	reasonable	hospital	bill.		
In	response	to	the	accounting	scandals	of	2001‐2002,	Congress	was	forced	to	
step	in	and	act.	On	July	26,	2002,	after	a	99‐0	vote	in	the	Senate	and	a	423‐3	vote	in	
the	House,	Congress	presented	the	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act	of	2002	to	President	George	
W.	 Bush.	 On	 July	 30,	 the	 president	 signed	 the	 Act	 into	 law,	 marking	 the	 most	
significant	piece	of	securities	legislation	since	the	Great	Depression.	Some	of	the	key	
provisions	 of	 the	 Act	 include:	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 five‐member	 accounting	
oversight	 board,	 increased	 ban	 on	 consulting	 activities	 for	 audit	 clients,	 audit	
partner	rotation9,	required	communication	with	the	audit	committee,	and	a	study	on	
the	value	of	principles‐based	accounting.	Pursuant	to	Section	108(d)	of	the	Act,	the	
Securities	 and	 Exchange	 Commission	 (SEC)10	 conducted	 this	 study	 and	 issued	 a	
report	 on	 their	 findings.	 There	was	 a	 growing	 about	 accounting	 standards	 in	 the	
United	 States,	 and	 many	 pointed	 to	 the	 high	 level	 of	 rules	 and	 guidance	 as	 the	
primary	 issue	 with	 GAAP.	 Assessing	 the	 value	 of	 a	 more	 ‘principles‐oriented’	
approach	 over	 the	 more	 ‘rules‐oriented’	 approach,	 the	 SEC	 reported	 that	 the	 US	
standard‐setting	 body	 would	 be	 “moving	 forward	 with	 a	 more	 principles‐based	
approach…as	a	means	of	increasing	the	quality	of	financial	reporting	and	restoring	
                                                            
9	Audit	partners	responsible	for	reviewing	the	audit	of	a	particular	client	must	be	rotated	every	five	
consecutive	years	(The	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act	of	2002,	n.d.)	
10	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC):	In	response	to	the	Great	Depression,	Congress	enacted	
into	law	the	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934,	creating	the	SEC.	The	SEC	was	tasked,	among	other	
duties,	with	helping	to	develop	and	standardize	the	financial	information	presented	to	stockholders	
and	investors.	The	SEC,	a	federal	agency,	delegates	its	role	of	developing	standards	to	the	
independent,	private	FASB.	
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trust	 in	 the	 current	 financial	 reporting	 system”	 (Bailey	 and	 Sawers,	 2012,	 p.	 41).	
That	 said,	 the	 SEC	 study	 does	 acknowledge	 that	 no	 regime	 can	 preclude	 fraud	
entirely.	Malevolent	actors	will	always	find	ways	in	which	to	behave	dishonestly,	no	
matter	 how	 well	 the	 rule	 or	 standard	 be	 been	 constructed.	 Still,	 the	 SEC	 study	
argues	for	a	reconceptualization	of	US	accounting	standards,	one	in	which	managers	
and	auditors	are	held	accountable	primarily	to	the	principles	behind	the	standards	
and	secondarily	to	the	detailed	implementation	guidance,	or	rules.		
	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	will	 be	 organized	 as	 follows.	 The	next	 section	
provides	 a	 description	 of	 the	 accounting	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 briefly	
describes	 the	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 standard‐setting	 process.	 The	 following	 two	
sections	further	discuss	the	United	States	legal	environment	and	how	incentives	of	
managers	 and	 auditors	 are	 not	 always	 aligned	 with	 those	 of	 investors.	 The	 next	
section	briefly	describes	both	 the	 rules‐oriented	and	principles‐oriented	approach	
to	 accounting	 standard‐setting,	 discusses	 in	 more	 detail	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 SEC	
study	(mentioned	above),	and	investigates	the	‘rules	versus	principles’	debate.	The	
following	section	examines	the	effects	of	standard	type	on	litigation	incidences	and	
outcomes,	 and	 the	 final	 section	 includes	 concluding	 remarks	 regarding	 standard	
implementation.	
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Conceptual	Framework,	the	FASB,	and	GAAP	
asdfadfasdfasdasdfasdf	 	
In	order	to	engage	in	an	informed	‘rules	versus	principles’	debate,	one	must	
first	 obtain	 a	 fundamental	 understanding	 of	 the	 conceptual	 framework.	 The	
framework	establishes	the	underlying	principles	behind	accounting	standards.	The	
Financial	Accounting	Standards	Board	(FASB)	is	a	full‐time,	well‐paid,	independent	
standard‐setting	 body,	 responsible	 for	 generating	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	
defining	its	objectives.	Shortly	after	the	board	was	created	in	1973,	they	developed	a	
theoretical	structure	that	would	help	define	and	resolve	 financial	reporting	 issues.	
The	 FASB,	 comprised	 of	 seven	 members	 from	 the	 accounting	 profession,	 the	
corporate	world,	and	academia,	is	supported	by	the	SEC	to	work	towards	its	mission	
to	 “establish	 and	 improve	 standards	 and	 financial	 reporting	 for	 the	 guidance	 and	
education	 of	 the	 public,	 which	 includes	 issuers,	 auditors,	 and	 users	 of	 financial	
information”	(Facts	about	FASB,	n.d.).	Armed	with	the	support	of	the	SEC,	the	FASB	
established	the	primary	objective	of	the	conceptual	framework:	decision	usefulness	
for	financial	statement	users.	Financial	statement	preparers	should	strive	to	create	
relevant	 and	 reliable	 information,	 which	 ultimately	 enhances	 comparability	
between	firms.	Each	of	these	supporting	pieces	contributes	to	decision	usefulness	in	
a	unique	way,	and	these	characteristics	can	even	be	in	conflict,	at	times.	
	 The	 level	 of	 relevance	 a	 piece	 of	 financial	 information	 is	 said	 to	 possess	 is	
determined	by	the	extent	to	which	it	makes	a	difference	in	the	decision	formulating	
process.	Relevance	itself	is	determined	by	three	main	components:	predictive	value,	
12 
 
confirmatory	 value,	 and	 materiality.	 The	 first	 component,	 predictive	 value,	
measures	 how	 valuable	 a	 piece	 of	 information	 is	 in	 the	 prediction	 formulation	
process.	Predictive	value	enhances	 investors’	 ability	 to	 forecast	 the	 future	amount	
and	 timing	 of	 cash	 that	 will	 be	 received	 and	 paid	 by	 a	 company.	 Since	 financial	
information	 is	 reported	 after	 the	 fact,	 the	 next	 component,	 confirmatory	 value,	
confirms	the	extent	to	which	past	predictions	were	correct.	Materiality,	the	final	and	
arguably	 most	 important	 component	 of	 relevance,	 describes	 information	 that,	 if	
incorrect	 or	 omitted	 entirely,	 would	 influence	 investors’	 decisions.	 For	 example,	
recording	 the	sale	of	an	 iPhone	case	 twice	 (also	known	as	double‐booking)	would	
not	 likely	have	a	material	 impact	on	an	 investor’s	decision	whereas	 recording	 the	
sale	of	an	iPhone	twice	would	likely	materially	impact	that	decision.	Though	this	is	a	
simple,	straight‐forward	example,	it	helps	illustrate	the	importance	of	materiality.		
	 Another	 facet	 of	 decision	usefulness	 is	 reliability.	 The	 concept	 of	 reliability	
asserts	 that	 the	 accounting	 numbers	 and	 descriptions	 match	 economic	 reality.	
Similar	to	relevance,	reliability	emphasizes	the	importance	of	faithfully	represented	
information.	That	is,	financial	information	should	reflect	the	economic	substance	of	
a	 transaction.	 The	 primary	 characteristics	 that	 increase	 reliability	 are:	
completeness,	 neutrality,	 and	 absence	 of	 error.	 Completeness	 assumes	 that	 no	
information	has	been	withheld	from	investors	and	all	material	information	has	been	
disclosed.	 Neutrality	 refers	 to	 the	 desirability	 for	 unbiased	 information.	 The	 final	
aspect,	 absence	 of	 error,	 does	 not	 imply	 total	 freedom	 from	 error,	 but	 rather	 a	
reasonable	 assurance	 that	 the	 information	 has	 been	 presented	 faithfully.	 Since	
13 
 
financial	statement	users	do	not	have	the	time	or	adequate	resources	to	evaluate	the	
factuality	of	content,	they	are	largely	forced	to	depend	on	the	reliability	assumption.	
	 If	 relevance	 and	 reliability	 are	 said	 to	 be	 in	 the	 same	 family,	 then	
comparability	 and	 consistency	 are	 in	 the	 rival	 family.	 An	 important	 aspect	 of	
decision	 usefulness	 revolves	 around	 investors’	 ability	 to	 compare	 financial	
information,	 both	 between	 firms	 and	 industries	 and	 over	 time.	 Comparability	 is	
achieved	 when	 firms	 account	 for	 similar	 transactions	 uniformly	 in	 financial	
reporting	 (Sawabe,	2005).	Consistency	asserts	 that	 transactions	will	 be	 accounted	
for	uniformly	over	time.	That	 is,	once	a	certain	accounting	treatment	is	adopted,	 it	
will	be	 followed	consistently	between	accounting	periods,	and	 if	a	change	were	 to	
occur,	 full	disclosure	as	 to	why	must	be	stated.	Between	 the	 two	sets	of	 concepts,	
comparability	 and	 consistency	 and	 relevance	 and	 reliability,	 an	 inherent	 trade‐off	
exists.	 Tessema	 asserts,	 “In	 the	 US	 the	 call	 for	 comparability	 has,	 amongst	 other	
things,	led	to	what	may	be	called	an	excessive	overregulation”	(Tessema,	2012,	p.	5).	
Still,	many	have	 called	 for	an	even	greater	emphasis	on	 comparability	because,	 as	
the	 standards	 exist	 currently,	 a	 single	 economic	 phenomenon	 can	 be	 faithfully	
represented	in	multiple	ways.		As	a	result,	accounting	standards	are	surrounded	by	
a	cloud	of	public	skepticism	(Tessema,	2012).	Deciding	which	way	 to	 tip	 the	scale	
regarding	 this	 inherent	 trade‐off	 is	 no	 trivial	 task.	 Even	within	 similar	 industries,	
organizations	 are	 very	 complex	 and	 their	 operations	 may	 differ	 substantially.	 By	
placing	more	emphasis	on	providing	information	that	reliably	depicts	the	economic	
reality	 of	 each	 individual	 organization,	 comparability	must	 suffer	 at	 the	 hands	 of	
relevance.		
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	 This	 trade‐off	 is	of	particular	 interest	 to	 the	FASB.	As	 the	body	responsible	
for	 setting	United	States	Generally	Accepted	Accounting	Principles	 (US	GAAP),	 the	
FASB	is	tasked	with	the	difficult	challenge	of	creating	and	implementing	a	generally	
accepted	 and	 universally	 practiced	 set	 of	 accounting	 standards.	 Founded	 in	 1887,	
the	 American	 Institute	 of	 Certified	 Public	 Accountants	 (AICPA)	 is	 the	 national	
professional	 organization	 of	 practicing	 CPAs,	 acting	 as	 a	 key	 contributor	 to	 the	
development	 of	 GAAP11.	 However,	 before	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 Securities	 and	
Exchange	Act	of	1934,	there	was	no	universal	body	of	accounting	standards	 in	the	
United	 States.	 At	 the	 request	 of	 the	 SEC,	 the	 AICPA	 appointed	 the	 Committee	 on	
Accounting	 Procedure	 (CAP)	 in	 1939.	 Between	 their	 inception	 and	1959,	 the	CAP	
issued	 fifty‐one	 Accounting	 Research	 Bulletins	 that	 dealt	 with	 a	 variety	 of	
accounting	problems.	Serving	in	a	largely	reactive	capacity,	though,	the	CAP	failed	to	
establish	a	structured	body	of	accounting	principles.	In	response,	the	AICPA	created	
the	Accounting	Principles	Board	 (APB)	 in	1959.	The	APB	 issued	31	APB	Opinions	
between	1959	and	1973,	but,	again,	the	APB	ultimately	failed	to	develop	an	overall	
conceptual	 framework	 that	 could	 assist	 in	 the	 resolution	 of	 problems	 as	 they	
surfaced.	The	FASB,	 created	 in	1973,	 is	 the	body	 currently	 responsible	 for	 setting	
accounting	standards	in	the	United	States.	US	GAAP	is	their	response	to	the	difficult	
task	of	creating	a	unified	set	of	accounting	standards	 that	are	not	only	based	on	a	
structured	 body	 of	 principles,	 but	 can	 also	 adapt	 to	 the	 ever‐changing	 business	
environment.	
                                                            
11 Mission and History. (n.d.) AICPA. Retrieved from AICPA.org 
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The	objective	of	US	GAAP,	as	stated	by	the	FASB,	is	the	development	of	“high‐
quality	accounting	standards	that	serve	the	public	interest	by	providing	information	
that	 is	 useful	 in	 making	 investment	 decisions”	 (Facts	 about	 FASB,	 n.d.).	 In	 other	
words,	financial	reports	produced	under	the	guidelines	of	US	GAAP	should	provide	
decision	 useful	 information	 about	 the	 reporting	 entity	 to	 current	 and	 prospective	
equity	investors,	lenders,	and	creditors.	The	FASB	relies	on	two	basic	premises	that	
are	vital	 to	achieving	this	objective:	(1)	GAAP	should	consider	the	entire	 investing	
community,	 not	 just	 the	 accounting	 profession	 and	 (2)	 it	 should	 operate	
transparently	 through	 a	 ‘due	 process’	 system,	 allowing	 input	 from	 all	 interested	
parties	(Kieso,	Weygandt,	and	Warfield,	2012).	Though	not	all	steps	will	always	be	
necessary,	the	FASB	outlines	the	seven	procedures	used	for	developing	accounting	
standards.	The	due	process	system	is	as	follows:	
1. Board	receives	recommendations	 for	possible	projects/reconsiderations	
of	existing	standards	
2. FASB	chairman	decides	which	projects	 to	move	 forward	with	by	adding	
them	to	the	technical	agenda	
3. Public	meeting(s)	held	to	deliberate	various	issues	verified/identified	by	
staff	
4. Board	 issues	 Exposure	 Draft	 (or	 Discussion	 Paper	 to	 help	 develop	
Exposure	Draft,	if	necessary)	
5. Board	holds	public	roundtable	meetings	on	Exposure	Draft,	if	necessary	
6. Staff	 analyzes	 comment	 letters/roundtable	 discussions	 and	 updates	
Exposure	Draft,	if	necessary	
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7. Board	 issues	 Accounting	 Standards	 Update	 explaining	 any	 changes	 or	
additions	to	US	GAAP	
If	 US	 GAAP	 functions	 correctly,	 from	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 to	 the	 due	
process	 system,	 all	 interested	 parties	 should	 be	 able	 to	 make	 well‐informed	
decisions	regarding	the	provision	of	resources	to	an	entity.	Often	times,	however,	US	
GAAP	fails	to	provide	financial	statement	users	with	decision	useful	information.	No	
set	of	accounting	standards	can	completely	preclude	fraud,	but	even	when	managers	
and	 auditors	 act	within	 the	 limits	 of	US	GAAP,	 information	 is	 not	 always	 relevant	
and	 reliable.	 Just	 as	 an	 inherent	 trade‐off	 between	 relevance	 and	 comparability	
exists	in	the	conceptual	framework,	there	is	a	similar	challenge	in	standard	setting.	
This	 challenge	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	principles‐based	 versus	 rules‐based	
debate.	 As	 you	may	 have	 noticed	 to	 this	 point,	 however,	 I	 have	 been	 referring	 to	
standards	 as	 either	 principles‐oriented	 or	 rules‐oriented.	 This	 difference	 is	 subtle,	
but	arguably	quite	important.	To	refer	to	a	standard	as	‘rules‐based’,	one	must	imply	
that	principles	take	a	back	seat	to	rules.	However,	all	standard	are	firmly	rooted	in	
the	conceptual	framework.	Surely,	some	standards	have	a	large	quantity	of	rules	and	
exceptions	(accounting	 for	earnings	per	share	guidance	extends	over	one	hundred	
fifty	pages),	but	the	issues	these	standards	address	are	highly	technical	and	require	
at	 least	 some	 level	of	 guidance.	Rather	 than	 referring	 to	 these	 standards	as	 rules‐
based,	they	will	be	referred	to	as	rules‐oriented.	Standards	that	are	generally	devoid	
of	 these	 bright‐line	 rules	 and	 exceptions,	 traditionally	 referred	 to	 as	 principles‐
based,	 will	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 principles‐oriented.	 By	 focusing	 on	 orientation,	 as	
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opposed	 to	 categorizing	 standards	 as	 either	 principles‐	 or	 rules‐based,	 the	
conversation	is	not	limited	to	deciding	between	two	broad,	exclusive	categories.	
Though	this	discussion	will	be	investigated	more	exhaustively	throughout,	at	
an	 elementary	 level,	 some	 standards	 allow	 for	 things	 such	 as	 estimates	 and	
valuations,	thus	placing	a	greater	value	on	relevance.	Standards	regarding	lease	and	
stock	 option	 accounting,	 for	 example,	 include	 numerous	 guidelines	 that	 are	
intended	to	increase	comparability.	Unfortunately,	managers	sometimes	elude	these	
guidelines	 and	 misrepresent	 economic	 reality,	 all	 the	 while	 within	 the	 technical	
limits	of	US	GAAP.	Comparability	 is	crucial	to	creating	decision	useful	 information,	
but	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 do	 not	 always	 lead	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 this	 goal.		
There	is	a	perceived	grave	concern	that	if	managers	are	given	more	discretion	over	
accounting	 treatments,	 they	will	 take	 advantage	 of	 this	 freedom	 and	 the	 financial	
statements	 will	 lose	 a	 large	 sense	 of	 comparability	 in	 exchange	 for	 increased	
relevance.	 However,	 rules	 do	 not	 stop	 malevolent	 managers	 and	 auditors	 from	
acting	 fraudulently,	 and	 they	 often	 disallow	 benevolent	managers	 from	 reporting	
the	most	relevant	information	to	the	investing	public.	Numerous	forces	are	at	work	
here,	 and	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 potential	 loss	 of	 comparability	 is	 justified	 by	 the	
increase	in	relevance,	and,	in	turn,	increase	in	reliability.	
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US	Legal	Environment:	Deregulation,	the	FASB,	and	the	Big	5	
	 	
During	 the	 1970s,	 the	 US	 Congress	 and	 other	 federal	 regulatory	 agencies	
began	 to	 loosen	 pricing,	 entry,	 and	 exit	 policies	 in	 the	 transportation,	 financial,	
energy,	 and	 communications	 industries.	 Commenting	 on	 deregulation,	 Winston	
(1998)	remarked,	“I	believe	that	the	academic	community	has	reached	a	consensus	
that	 [its]	 net	 benefits	 to	 consumers	 are	 substantial”	 (Winston,	 1998,	 p.	 90).	
Regulated	markets,	he	argues,	tend	to	result	in	economic	inefficiencies.	Conversely,	
deregulated	 markets	 are	 largely	 free	 from	 pricing,	 entry,	 and	 exit	 restrictions,	
allowing	 firms	 to	 be	 competitive	 and	 maximize	 potential	 efficiency.	 During	 this	
period	 of	 sweeping	 deregulation	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 however,	 the	 accounting	
industry	seemed	to	move	in	the	opposite	direction.	In	highly	litigious	environments,	
such	as	the	one	found	in	the	United	States,	standard	setters	grow	reluctant	to	accept	
standards	 that	 permit	 multiple	 interpretations	 and	 applications	 of	 the	 same	
principle	 (Tessema,	 2012),	 and	 thus	 they	 include	 more	 rules,	 regulations,	 and	
guidance.	 Considering	 the	 legal	 environment	 and	 pressures	 from	 special	 interests	
and	 auditors	 could	 explain	 the	FASBs	 tendency	 to	 introduce	 increasingly	 complex	
and	 detailed	 accounting	 standards	 (Sawabe,	 2005)	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s.	 Any	
existence	 of	 discretion	 in	 accounting	 decisions	 exposes	 managers,	 as	 well	 as	
auditors,	to	a	higher	risk	of	litigation.	Even	if	managers	act	in	good	faith	and	exhibit	
the	required	professional	judgment,	enforcing	agencies	can	still	allege	violation	of	a	
principles‐oriented	 standard.	 As	 such,	 auditors	 prefer	 more	 rules‐oriented	
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standards	 because	 they	 use	 readily‐determinable	 values,	 such	 as	 acquisition	 cost	
and	market	price,	which	can	serve	as	a	layer	of	protection	for	their	firm	from	future	
legal	action.	
Auditors	 are	 also	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 accounting	 conservatism,	 or	 the	
propensity	 to	 require	 a	 high	degree	 of	 verification	before	making	 a	 legal	 claim	 to	
any	 profit.	 For	 example,	 probable	 losses	 and	 most	 expenses	 are	 recognized	
immediately,	 whereas	 revenue	 is	 almost	 never	 recognized	 until	 the	 earnings	
process	is	complete.	The	idea	here	is	that	it	is	easier	to	explain	an	understatement	
than	 an	 overstatement,	 especially	 in	 the	 court	 of	 law.	 Though	 accounting	
conservatism	 is	 conducive	 to	 the	 United	 States	 legal	 environment	 and	may	 serve	
firms	and	auditors	well,	it	does	not	provide	the	most	faithfully	represented	picture	
to	investors.	
	 Even	 after	 the	 Private	 Securities	 Litigation	 Reform	 Act	 of	 1995	 (PSLRA)12	
adjusted	the	United	States	legal	system	to	make	accounting	firms	less	susceptible	to	
lawsuits	by	private	plaintiffs	(Bratton,	2003),	more	detailed	guidance	continued	to	
emerge	 in	 accounting	 standards.	 In	 the	 years	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 Enron	 scandal,	
accounting	firms	realized	that	the	risk	of	 lawsuits	based	on	alleged	negligence	and	
inappropriate	application	of	GAAP	was	high	(Benston,	Bromwich,	and	Wagenhofer,	
2006).	As	a	result,	the	accounting	industry	was	incentivized	to	ask	for	more	rules	in	
hope	of	avoiding	these	costly	lawsuits.	Donelson,	McInnis,	and	Mergenthaler	called	
                                                            
12	Rule	10b‐5	of	the	PSLRA	assets	that	a	complaint	must	allege	five	sufficient	facts	to	survive	a	motion	
to	dismiss	including:	(1)	a	misstatement	or	omission	of	(2)	a	material	fact	(3)	made	with	intent	(4)	
that	the	plaintiff	justifiably	relied	on	(5)	causing	injury	in	connection	with	the	purchase	or	sale	of	
securities	(Skinner,	1994).	
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these	 assumptions	 into	 question	 during	 their	 2012	 study	 titled	 “Rules‐Based	
Accounting	 Standards	 and	 Litigation”.	 Somewhat	 intuitively,	 they	 found	 that	
standards	with	more	 clear	 guidance	 and	 rules	 do,	 in	 fact,	 result	 in	 less	 litigation.	
Interesting	though,	 they	did	not	 find	a	statistically	significant	difference	 in	 lawsuit	
outcomes13.	 So,	 is	 the	 FASB	 acting	 as	 an	 independent	 standard‐setting	 body,	 or	 is	
GAAP	 “as	 much	 a	 product	 of	 political	 action	 as	 it	 is	 of	 careful	 logic	 or	 empirical	
findings”	(Kieso,	Weygandt,	and	Warfield,	2012)?	
	
Managers	and	auditors	prefer	rules,	but	should	investors?		
 
As	 Sawabe	 (2005)	 pointed	 out,	 accounting	 standards	 with	 more	 detailed	
guidance	 are	 systematically	 favored	 by	Anglo‐Saxon	 standard	 setters.	 By	 the	 year	
2000,	non‐audit	services14	had	grown	to	represent	over	fifty	percent	of	revenue	for	
the	Big	5	accounting	firms.	To	find	an	example	of	compromised	independence,	one	
need	not	look	any	further	than	the	Enron	case.	Enron	solidified	its	relationship	with	
Arthur	Anderson	in	1993	when	Anderson	not	only	provided	internal	audit	services	
to	the	firm,	but	also	sold	the	firm	its	compliance	system15	(Herrick	and	Barrionuevo,	
                                                            
13	That	is,	the	type	of	standard	(‘rules‐based’	or	‘principles‐based’)	and	presence	of	detailed	guidance	
did	not	have	an	effect	on	the	outcome	of	individual	lawsuits.	These	results,	and	the	associated	study,	
will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	later.	
14	Pursuant	to	Section	201	of	the	Act,	non‐audit	services	include,	but	are	not	limited	to:	bookkeeping	
of	the	audit	client,	information	system	design	and	implementation,	valuation	services,	actuarial	
services,	internal	audit	services,	human	resources,	investment	advisory,	and	legal	and	expert	
services.		
15	Compliance	systems	help	firms	learn	about	their	GAAP	compliance	responsibilities	and	ensure	
employee	understanding	of	these	responsibilities.	They	help	“manage	risks	associated	with	changing	
product	and	service	offerings	and	new	legislation	enacted	to	address	developments	in	the	
marketplace”	(Compliance	Examination	Manual,	n.d.).	
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2001).	 In	 general,	 auditors	 are	 tasked	with	 the	often	difficult	 undertaking	of	 both	
keeping	 their	 clients	 happy	 and	 performing	 their	 duty	 to	 the	 investing	 public.	 At	
times,	 this	 can	 prove	 to	 be	 detrimental	 to	 the	 auditor‐client	 relationship.	 With	
Enron,	 Arthur	 Anderson	 faced	 this	 inherent	 tension	 in	 addition	 to	 compromised	
independence:	“The	audit	firms’	incentive	to	take	positions	adverse	to	their	clients’	
with	 respect	 to	 aggressive	 treatments	 diminished	 correspondingly…An	 auditor	 is	
hardly	likely	to	question	the	effectiveness	of	a	compliance	system	sold	by	his	or	her	
firm”	 (Bratton,	 2003,	 p.	 1030).	 Arthur	Anderson’s	 long‐standing	 relationship	with	
Enron	 certainly	 affected	 their	 judgment	 regarding	 Enron’s	 financial	 position	 and	
internal	controls.	Arthur	Anderson	was	motivated	to	maintain	their	very	profitable	
relationship	 with	 Enron,	 and	 in	 doing	 so	 they	 ignored	 economic	 reality	 and	
approved	 highly	 questionable	 transactions,	 ultimately	 cumulating	 in	 one	 of	 the	
world’s	largest	ever	accounting	frauds.		
	 Throughout	the	1990s,	the	accounting	profession	lobbied	with	frequency	and	
success.	 Bratton	 (2003)	 alleged	 that	 the	 profession	 had	 “become	 famously	
aggressive	 protecting	 its	 own	 interests	 and	 those	 of	 it	 clients	 in	 the	 corridors	 of	
power	in	Washington”	(Bratton,	2003,	p.	1033).	Special	interest	groups	fighting	for	
the	accounting	profession	shot	down	reform	to	accounting	 for	stock	options16	and	
consulting	fees.	Many	raised	concern,	including	Arthur	Levitt	in	his	book	Take	on	the	
Street,	 about	 what	 was	 happening	 on	 Wall	 Street	 and	 in	 Corporate	 America	
regarding	these	issues,	especially	consulting	fees.	As	mentioned	above,	by	the	year	
                                                            
16		A	stock	option	gives	an	individual	an	opportunity,	but	not	an	obligation,	to	purchase	a	share	of	a	
company’s	stock	at	a	predetermined	price	at	a	point	or	during	a	specified	period	in	the	future.	
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2000,	non‐audit	services	had	reached	over	fifty	percent	of	total	revenue	for	the	Big	
5.	A	major	component	of	those	services	was	consulting	fees.	Often	times,	accounting	
firms	provided	their	clients	with	both	consultation	and	audit	services.	Consulting	fee	
reform	 called	 for	 a	 separation	 of	 these	 duties.	 As	 it	 stood,	 accounting	 firms	were	
essentially	 auditing	 the	work	of	 their	 own	employees.	 Excluding	 the	possibility	 of	
collusion,	audit	engagement	teams	were	less	likely	to	doubt	work	provided	by	their	
own	 firm.	With	 this	 framework	 in	place,	 “no	 institutional	mechanism	ensures	 that	
the	 public	 interest	 trumps	 the	 interests	 of	 audit	 firms	 and	 their	 clients	 in	GAAP’s	
promulgation”	 (Bratton,	 2003,	 p.	 1038).	 Thus,	 accounting	 firms	 were	 more	
incentivized	 to	 keep	 customers	 happy	 while	 generating	 consulting	 fees	 than	 to	
demand	that	the	economic	reality	of	the	client	has	been	faithfully	presented	to	the	
investing	 public,	 creditors,	 and	 banks.	 If	 managers	 and	 auditors	 disagreed	 on	 an	
issue,	auditors’	only	recourse	was	to	recommend	a	different	accounting	treatment,	
but	they	often	did	so	at	the	risk	of	losing	both	the	audit	and	consulting	fees.	
	 Standard	 creation	 and	 reform	 gives	 rise	 to	 another	 complicated	 issue.	
Throughout	 the	 SEC’s	 existence,	 the	 commission	 has	 delegated	 the	 task	 of	
accounting	 standard	 creation	 to	 private,	 independently	 funded	 groups17.	
Unfortunately,	 though,	at	 times	the	“agency	delegation	model”	(Bratton,	2003)	has	
failed	 and	 these	 groups	 have	 fallen	 prey	 to	 special	 interests.	 For	 example,	 stock	
option	accounting	reform	was	first	tried	by	the	APB	in	1972,	and	again	by	the	FASB	
during	 the	1990s.	 In	1972,	many	were	 calling	 for	 the	 immediate	 expensing	of	 the	
granting	 of	 stock	 options	 to	 employees	 and	 managers.	 With	 the	 issuance	 of	 APB	
                                                            
17	These	groups	are	as	follows:	CAP	(1939‐1959),	APB	(1959‐1973),	and	FASB	(1973‐Present).	
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Opinion	25,	 the	APB	allowed	managers	 to	 continue	not	expensing	 stock	options	 if	
the	 option	 price	was	 below	market	 value	 on	 the	 grant	 date	 (Miller	 and	 Bahnson,	
2002).	 Rather	 than	 providing	 clarification	 on	 a	 highly	 debated	 issue,	 the	 APB	
created	 a	 bright‐line	 rule	 that	 essentially	 allowed	 and	 arguably	 encouraged	
managers	 to	 pay	 employees,	 and	 themselves,	 large	 amounts	 of	 compensation	
without	 recording	any	expenses.	This	was	a	big	win	 for	 industry,	 and	when	 these	
unreported	expenses	reached	large	proportions	of	the	income	statement	in	the	early	
1990s,	 the	 FASB	 was	 forced	 to	 return	 to	 the	 issue.	 The	 FASB	 proposed	 that	 an	
expense	should	be	recorded	equal	to	the	value	of	the	stock	options	on	grant	date.	To	
the	 huge	 relief	 of	 managers,	 the	 FASB	 compromised	 with	 SFAS	 123,	 merely	
suggesting	the	reporting	of	an	expense	on	the	income	statement	but	permitting	the	
reporting	 in	 a	 pro	 forma	 footnote	 (Miller	 and	 Bahnson,	 2002).	 The	 agency	
delegation	model	“works	well	only	so	long	as	the	agency	successfully	resists	capture	
by	 the	 interests	of	 the	actors	 it	 regulates”	 (Bratton,	2003,	p.	1032).	The	FASB	has	
shown	 time	 and	 time	 again	 that	 it	 will	 succumb	 to	 political	 pressure.	 These	
pressures	 often	 come	 from	 industry,	 but	 they	 can	 also	 come	 from	 the	 SEC	 and	
Congress.	 SFAS	 123	 was	 largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 preparer	 constituency,	 which	
exploded	 and	 called	 upon	 members	 of	 Congress	 to	 threaten	 the	 board	 with	
extinction	(Miller	and	Bahnson,	2002).	The	FASB	can	exist	only	so	long	as	Congress	
recognizes	 it	 as	 the	 standard‐setting	 body.	 As	 such,	 they	 have	 very	 little	 room	 to	
disregard	 the	will	 of	 the	 Congress,	 even	 if	 they	 do	 not	 agree	with	 the	 Congress’s	
position.	After	the	fall	of	Arthur	Anderson,	the	fear	grew	that	if	any	of	the	remaining	
four	firms	were	able	to	gain	a	direct	or	indirect	influence	over	the	FASB,	they	would	
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stop	 at	 nothing	 to	 protect	 their	 rents	 from	 further	 restriction.	 As	 accounting	
standards	 stand,	 Bratton	 believes	 they	 “will	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 best	 choice	 in	 a	
second‐best	world	so	long	as	they	constrain	managers	and	auditors	most	of	the	time	
[from	opportunistic	behavior]”	(Bratton,	2003,	p.	1037).		
	
The	Rules	vs.	Principles	Debate:	An	Introduction	
	 	
As	mentioned	above,	 the	primary	objective	of	 the	FASB	 is	 to	 “establish	and	
improve	 standards	 and	 financial	 reporting	 for	 the	 guidance	 and	 education	 of	 the	
public,	which	 includes	 issuers,	 auditors,	 and	users	of	 financial	 information”	 (Facts	
about	FASB,	n.d.).	Basing	 these	 standards	on	 the	 conceptual	 framework,	 the	FASB	
hopes	 that	 financial	 statement	preparers	will	 adhere	 to	 the	 concepts	of	 relevance,	
reliability,	 and	 comparability	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 decision	 usefulness.	 Once	 a	
standard	has	been	conceptualized	and	created,	 the	next	 step	 is	 implementation	of	
said	standard.	There	are	two	dominant	thoughts	on	the	process	of	implementation.	
One	 school	 of	 thought	 argues	 that	 standards	 should	 be	 very	 heavily	 based	 on	 the	
principles	 inherent	 in	 the	 conceptual	 framework.	 The	 other	 school	 of	 thought	
believes	 that	 standards	 should	 include	 detailed	 guidance,	 or	 rules,	 regarding	 how	
that	 standard	 should	 be	 implemented.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 difference,	 the	 ‘rules	 vs.	
principles’	debate	were	born.	Think	of	the	following	example	for	a	moment:	curfew	
for	a	high	school	student.	The	parents	of	the	high	school	student	have	two	options.	
The	 first	 is	 that	 they	may	set	 their	child’s	curfew	for,	 say,	1:00	AM.	This	would	be	
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characterized	as	a	bright‐line	rule,	one	that	allows	the	child	to	return	home	at	12:59	
AM	unscathed.	However,	if	the	child	was	to	return	home	at	1:01	AM,	he	or	she	could,	
and	likely	would,	face	the	wrath	of	mom	and	dad,	and	rightfully	so.	Conversely,	the	
parents	 of	 the	 high	 school	 student	 could	 tell	 their	 child	 to	 return	 home	 at	 a	
‘reasonable	time’.	In	this	situation,	it	is	largely	up	to	the	child	to	determine	what	was	
meant	by	reasonable.	It	may	be	the	case	that	child	decides	that	a	reasonable	time	is	
12:00	AM.	 It	may	 also	be	 the	 case,	 and	most	parents	would	 likely	 agree	with	 this	
sentiment,	that	the	child	would	interpret	a	reasonable	time	as	3:00	AM.	As	such,	 it	
seems	that	rules	are	a	better	solution	to	this	dilemma.		
	 The	solution	may	not	be	so	evident,	though.	There	are	two	primary	forces	at	
play	here.	The	 first	 is	 that	 the	child	may	very	well	 return	home	at	12:00	AM.	This	
makes	both	the	child	and	the	parent	happy.	The	second	force	is	that	if	the	child	was	
to	return	home	at	3:00	AM,	it	is	likely	that	his	or	her	parents	will	be	very	upset	and	
he	 or	 she	will	 face	 a	 consequence.	 As	 such,	 he	 or	 she	will	 be	much	 less	 likely	 to	
return	home	late	again.	Initially,	there	may	be	some	costs	involved	on	both	sides	in	
trying	to	understand	each	other’s	desires	and	arrive	on	an	agreed	time.	Ultimately,	
though,	 the	 parents	 and	 child	will	 arrive	 upon	 a	 reasonable	 time	 to	 return	 home,	
and	both	will	be	happier.		
	 Although	this	example	is	relatively	elementary,	it	illustrates	some	of	the	key	
arguments	 posed	 by	 proponents	 of	 principles‐oriented	 and	 rules‐oriented	
approaches	 to	 standard‐setting.	 All	 standards	 are	 based	 on	 the	 conceptual	
framework,	and	are	thus	grounded	in	principles.	They	earn	their	distinction	based	
on	 the	 presence	 of	 rules,	 exceptions,	 and	 guidance.	 The	 GAAP	 hierarchy	 is	 a	
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descriptive	 term	 explaining	 preferences	 either	 toward	 overarching	 concepts	 and	
principles	or	toward	specific,	context‐bound	rules.	 	Many	are	concerned	that	GAAP	
has	grown	to	represent	the	latter,	a	guidance	heavy,	rules‐oriented	set	of	standards	
that	place	greater	emphasis	on	 the	 form	of	certain	rules	 than	the	substance	of	 the	
principles	 (Benston,	 Bromwich,	 and	Wagenhofer,	 2006;	 Bailey	 and	 Sawers,	 2012;	
Tessema,	2012).		Yet,	others	are	not	so	convinced.	Following	the	fallout	of	the	Enron	
scandal,	 both	 the	 SEC	 and	 FASB	 issued	 reports	 on	 the	 value	 of	 ‘principles‐based’	
standards.	 They	 concluded	 that	 there	 was	 indeed	 a	 problem	 with	 accounting	
standards	 in	 the	United	 States,	 but	 they	were	hesitant	 to	describe	GAAP	as	 solely	
‘rules‐based’.	 Whichever	 characterization	 of	 US	 GAAP	 is	 true,	 Bailey	 and	 Sawers	
point	to	prior	research	suggesting	that	“managers	and	accounting	professionals	use	
the	 latitude	 in	 accounting	 standards,	 either	 judgment	 in	 applying	 principles	 or	
structuring	 transactions	 around	 rigid	 rules,	 to	 manage	 earnings	 and	 support	
aggressive	 financial	 reporting”	 (Bailey	 and	 Sawers,	 2012,	 p.	 27).	 There	 seems	 to	
have	 been	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 application	 of	 accounting	 standards	 from	 attempting	 to	
accurately	 communicate	 the	 economic	 reality	 of	 a	 transaction	 to	merely	 being	 in	
compliance	with	standards.	 In	other	words,	whether	the	standard	being	applied	 is	
more	 rules‐oriented	 or	more	principles‐oriented	 in	 nature,	 the	evidence	 seems	 to	
suggest	that	managers	are	focusing	more	on	presenting	the	firm	in	the	most	positive	
light	 that	 GAAP	will	 allow	 rather	 than	 attempting	 to	 faithfully	 represent	 the	 firm	
(Hackenbrack	 and	 Nelson,	 1996;	 Salterio	 and	 Koonce,	 1997;	 Nelson	 and	 Kinney,	
1997;	Hoffman	and	Patton,	2002).		
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Rules‐Oriented	Standards:	Defined	
	 Before	 the	 conversation	 can	 continue,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 define	 the	 terms	
being	 discussed.	 US	 GAAP	 has	 been	 characterized	 as	 a	 highly	 influential	 and	
regarded	 system	 of	 rules.	 Though	 all	 may	 not	 agree	 with	 this	 characterization	
entirely,	 the	 FASB	 did	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 trending	 towards	 standards	 with	 an	
extremely	 high	 level	 of	 specification	 around	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century.	 Eaton	
remarked,	“keeping	the	account	preparers	inside	the	rules	meant	anticipating	where	
they	would	find	loopholes	and	closing	them	off”	(Eaton,	2005,	p.	7).	Historically,	the	
FASB	had	done	quite	a	good	job	policing	these	loopholes	and	issuing	more	detailed	
guidance	on	how	to	deal	with	them	as	they	emerged.	Unfortunately,	it	only	takes	one	
major	slip	up	to	derail	 the	entire	effort.	The	focus	on	and	call	 for	more	principles‐
oriented	 standards	 really	 emerged	when	 it	was	 revealed	 in	 2001	 that	 Enron	 had	
taken	 advantage	 of	 a	 complex,	 highly	 detailed	 accounting	 standard.	 Though	 both	
Enron	 and	 Arthur	 Anderson	 alike	 ignored	 many	 of	 the	 principles	 behind	 the	
standard,	GAAP	still	 absorbed	a	 large	hit,	even	causing	Congress,	 the	SEC,	and	 the	
FASB	to	question	its	value.		
	 Yet,	 rules	 are	 not	 fundamentally	 bad	 or	 even	 ineffective.	 One	 of	 the	many	
advantages	of	more	rules‐oriented	accounting	standards	 is	 that	 they	provide	clear	
guidance	 to	 both	 preparers	 and	 auditors.	 This	 guidance	 can	 significantly	 reduce	
managers’	 ability	 to	 influence	 or	 manipulate	 relevant	 accounting	 numbers	
(Tessema,	 2012).	 The	 SEC	 states	 that	 “Inherent	 in	 a	 rules‐based	 approach	 is	 the	
intent	 to	minimize	 the	 judgmental	 component	 of	 accounting	 practice	 through	 the	
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establishment	 of	 finely	 articulated	 rules	 that	 attempt	 to	 foresee	 all	 possible	
application	 situations”	 (SEC,	 2003).	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 few	 very	 large,	
publicized	 frauds,	 these	more	rules‐oriented	 standards	have	 functioned	seemingly	
well	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Rules	 and	 detailed	 guidance	 give	 standards‐setters	 the	
ability	to	accurately	and	effectively	communicate	their	requirements	and	intentions	
to	 managers.	 The	 clear	 expression	 of	 these	 expectations	 can	 help	 to	 reduce	 the	
imprecision	and	uncertainty	that	allow	managers	to	potentially	report	aggressively	
(Nobes,	2005;	Schipper,	2003).	 In	 fact,	Katherine	Schipper,	 a	member	of	 the	FASB	
when	 they	published	 their	 commentary	on	principles‐based	accounting	standards,	
remarked	that	rules	give	financial	statements	increased	comparability	and	provide	
auditors	 and	 regulators	with	 increased	 ability	 to	 verify	 those	 financial	 statements	
(Schipper,	2003).	Though	some	have	argued	that	rules	simply	create	a	safe	harbor	
under	which	auditors	can	hide	 from	litigation,	rules	do	give	auditors	 the	ability	 to	
consistently	 apply	 standards	 amongst	 clients,	 between	 auditing	 firms,	 and	 across	
the	United	States.	Rules‐oriented	standards	certainly	are	not	perfect,	but	as	Bratton	
(2003)	suggested,	they	may	be	better	than	the	alternative.	
Principles‐Oriented	Standards:	Defined	
	 Principles‐oriented	 standards	 rest	 primarily	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘substance	
over	 form’.	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 principle	 ensures	 that	 the	 financial	 statements	
present	 a	 relevant	 and	 reliable	 representation	 of	 actual	 transactions	 and	 events.	
Application	of	 the	 ‘substance	over	 form’	 concept	 involves	 the	question	of	whether	
the	 firm	has	presented	 its	 financial	 statements	 such	 that	 they	 represent	economic	
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reality	(substance),	or	that	they	merely	present	compliance	with	the	letter	of	the	law	
(form).	Bratton	(2003)	characterizes	principles‐oriented	standards	as	more	broadly	
stated,	often	excluding	particular	application	guidance	on	 their	 face.	Though	some	
standards	 are	 objectively	 rules‐oriented18,	 even	 principles‐oriented	 standards	 can	
work	 like	 rules	 when	 applied	 literally.	 As	 firms	 grow	 increasingly	 innovative,	
complex,	and	specialized,	so	do	their	transactions.	As	such,	the	particulars	of	these	
transactions	 may	 differ	 considerably	 or	 slightly,	 yet	 rules	 enforce	 common	
treatment.	 Though	 Schipper	 (2003)	 was	 hesitant	 to	 describe	 US	 GAAP	 as	 rules‐
oriented,	 she	 did	 admit	 that	 a	more	 principles‐based	 system	 is	 desirable	 because	
such	 a	 system	 permits	 the	 appropriate	 exercise	 of	 professional	 judgment	 to	
auditors.		
	 Principles‐oriented	 standards	 intentionally	 avoid	 exhaustive	 specifications,	
relying	on	the	conceptual	framework	and	the	principles	included	therein.	GAAP	was	
created	 with	 the	 intent	 to	 convey	 four	 basic	 principles:	 relevance,	 consistency,	
verifiability,	 and	 full	disclosure.	Though	 there	 is	a	strong	 theoretical	argument	 for	
principles‐oriented	 accounting	 standards	 (Sawabe,	 2005;	 Eaton,	 2005;	 Tessema,	
2012),	 it	 is	not	quite	so	simple	 in	practice.	There	exists	an	 inherent	 tension	 in	the	
current	 conceptual	 framework.	 For	 example,	 the	 framework	 requires	 verifiable	
information	 but	 also	 requires	 that	 information	 to	 be	 relevant.	 At	 times,	 the	most	
relevant	numbers	may	not	be	verifiable,	and	vice	versa.	For	example,	GAAP	permits	
                                                            
18	The	most	classic	example	is	the	standards	regarding	lease	accounting.	These	standards	contain	
many	bright‐line	rules,	including	cut‐off	points	and	yes‐or‐no	distinctions,	which	decide	how	certain	
leases	should	be	accounted	for.	Lease	accounting	will	be	discussed	in	further	detail	later.		
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the	use	of	 fair	value	accounting19.	Fair	values	are	not	always	readily	determinable,	
especially	 in	 highly	 specialized	 industries,	 but	 they	 are	 often	more	 relevant	 than	
more	 objective	 measures	 of	 value,	 like	 historical	 cost.	 In	 creating	 standards	 that	
permit	the	use	of	fair	value	accounting,	the	FASB	sometimes	places	a	higher	value	on	
relevance	 than	 verifiability	 since	 managers	 likely	 know	 most	 about	 their	 firm’s	
transactions	 and	 economic	 reality.	 In	 a	 theoretical	 world	 in	 which	 managers	 are	
completely	 benevolent,	 a	 solely	 principles‐oriented	 set	 of	 accounting	 standards	
would	function	better.	However,	this	does	not	describe	the	world	GAAP	functions	in.	
Financial	 statement	users	would	 likely	 require	 increased	disclosures	outlining	 the	
accounting	treatment	decision‐making	process,	leading	to	potential	inefficiencies.	
	 Now	 that	 both	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 and	 principles‐oriented	 standards	
have	been	defined,	the	‘accounting	standards	continuum’	can	be	introduced.	On	one	
end	of	the	continuum	are	more	broadly‐defined	principles.	On	the	other	end	of	the	
continuum	 are	more	 highly‐detailed	 rules.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 detailed	 rules	 can	
increase	 verifiability	 and	 consistency	 by	 providing	 managers	 and	 auditors	 with	
guidance.	Alternatively,	broad	principles	can	increase	relevance	by	giving	managers	
the	 ability	 to	more	 faithfully	 represent	 their	 firm’s	 financial	 position.	 Around	 the	
turn	of	the	century,	the	pendulum	had	swung	towards	the	rules‐oriented	end	of	the	
spectrum.	 Since	 the	 Enron	 scandal,	 subsequent	 fallout,	 and	 implementation	 of	
Sarbanes‐Oxley,	 the	 pendulum	began	 swinging	 back	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 principles,	
though	still	on	the	rules	side	of	the	continuum.	There	are	many	opinions	about	the	
                                                            
19	Under	US	GAAP	(FAS	157),	fair	value	is	the	amount	at	which	the	asset	could	be	bought	or	sold	in	a	
current	transaction	between	willing	parties,	or	transferred	to	an	equivalent	party,	other	than	in	a	
liquidation	sale	(Summary	of	Statement	No.	157).	
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optimal	 position	 for	 US	 GAAP	 on	 the	 accounting	 standards	 continuum.	
Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	 about	 that	 position	 between	 managers,	
accountants,	 and	 the	 regulatory	 bodies.	 The	 SEC	 explored	 the	 debate	 about	 the	
optimal	position	 in	a	 report	 issued	 in	2003,	 suggesting	a	potential	 combination	of	
rules‐based	 and	 principles‐based	 standards.	 Though	 the	 study	 has	 prompted	
numerous	 discussions	 between	 the	 FASB	 and	 the	 IASB,	 nothing	 tangible	 has	
resulted	thus	far.	
	
SEC	Study	on	the	Adoption	of	a	Principles‐Based	Accounting	System	
sdfg	
	 Pursuant	 to	Section	108(d)	of	 the	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act,	 the	SEC	conducted	a	
study	 on	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 principles‐based	 accounting	 system	 during	 2003.	 As	
suggested	 above,	 many	 groups	 and	 individuals,	 from	 investors	 to	 creditors	 to	
managers	to	even	the	CEO	of	Arthur	Anderson,	pointed	to	the	failure	of	US	GAAP	in	
preventing	 the	 accounting	 scandals	 of	 2001‐2002.	 The	 SEC	 examined	whether	US	
GAAP	is,	 in	 fact,	a	rules‐based	set	of	accounting	standards,	as	well	as	 the	potential	
value	of	a	more	principles‐based	set	of	standards.	The	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act,	the	most	
significant	piece	of	 securities	 legislation	since	 the	creation	of	 the	SEC,	 called	upon	
the	SEC	to	“conduct	a	study	on	the	adoption	by	the	United	States	financial	reporting	
system	of	a	principles‐based	accounting	system”	(SEC,	2003).	The	growing	concern	
in	the	United	States	was	that	US	GAAP	had	become	too	oriented	around	bright‐line	
tests,	which	allowed	managers	to	misuse	the	current	standards	by	complying	with	
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the	 letter	of	 the	 law	but	not	 the	spirit	of	standard.	There	was	also	a	 large	concern	
about	 the	 growing	 level	 of	 exceptions	 to	 the	 underlying	 principles	 of	 certain	
standards,	 permitting	 firms	 to	 treat	 similar	 transactions	 and	 events	 with	 similar	
economic	 substance	 differently.	 Another	 concern	 revolved	 around	 the	 increasing	
need	 and	 demand	 for	 detailed	 implementation	 guidance,	 creating	 complexity	 and	
ambiguity	about	the	application	of	US	GAAP.		
Bearing	 in	mind	 these	 concerns,	 the	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act	mandated	 that	 the	
SEC	explore	the	following	four	areas:		
(i)	 the	 extent	 to	which	 principles‐based	 accounting	 and	 financial	 reporting	
exists	in	the	United	States;	(ii)	the	length	of	time	required	for	change	from	a	
rules‐based	 to	 a	 principles‐based	 financial	 reporting	 system;	 (iii)	 the	
feasibility	of	and	proposed	methods	by	which	a	principles‐based	system	may	
be	 implemented;	 and	 (iv)	 a	 thorough	 economic	 analysis	 of	 the	
implementation	of	a	principles‐based	system	(SEC,	2003).	
As	a	 result,	 the	SEC	determined	that	 the	current	system	of	 financial	 reporting	and	
corporate	governance	were	 in	need	of	 improvement.	The	Sarbanes‐Oxley	Act	may	
be	 viewed	 as	 a	 legislative	 attempt	 “to	 better	 align	 the	 incentives	 of	management,	
auditors	 and	 other	 professionals	with	 those	 of	 investors”	 (SEC,	 2003).	 This	 study	
evaluated	the	ways	in	which	the	SEC	and	the	FASB	may	achieve	the	goals	set	forth	
by	the	Act.	At	the	conclusion	of	the	report,	the	SEC	laid	out	the	following	six	action	
items:	 in	 the	 short‐term,	 conduct	a	 comprehensive	 review	of	 current	 standards	 to	
identify	 and	 address	 those	 that	 are	 rules‐oriented,	 establish	 one	 standard	 setter,	
begin	working	 towards	accounting	standard	convergence	with	 the	 IASB,	and	 issue	
33 
 
more	 principles‐oriented	 standards,	 and	 in	 the	 long‐term,	 conduct	 conceptual	
framework	improvement	projects	and	redefine	the	GAAP	hierarchy.		
	 At	some	point,	or	more	likely	over	a	period	of	time,	the	system	of	checks	and	
balances	critical	 to	 investor	confidence	 in	 financial	reporting	began	to	deteriorate.	
Though	 the	 SEC	 acknowledged	 that	 no	 standard‐setting	 regime	 can	 completely	
preclude	fraud,	they	did	suggest	an	optimal	standard	setting	process.	In	studying	the	
current	 condition	 of	 US	 GAAP,	 they	 concluded	 that	 “imperfections	 exist	 when	
standards	are	established	on	either	a	 rules‐based	or	a	principles‐only	basis”	 (SEC,	
2003).	 ‘Principles‐only’	 standards	 present	 a	 problem	 because	 they	 provide	
managers	 and	 auditors	 with	 very	 little	 guidance	 for	 exercising	 professional	
judgment.	 This	 lack	 of	 guidance	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 significant	 loss	 of	 comparability	
because	the	potential	exists	for	similar	transactions	to	be	accounted	for	differently.	
Conversely,	‘rules‐based’	standards	can	provide	not	only	a	vehicle	but	also	a	defense	
for	evading	the	intent	of	the	standard.	Rules‐based	standards	can	provide	managers	
with	a	roadmap	to	circumvent	accounting	standards	and	result	in	financial	reports	
that	are	not	representationally	faithful.	As	such,	the	SEC	was	hesitant	to	characterize	
US	 GAAP	 as	 entirely	 ‘rules‐based’,	 but	 they	 did	 offer	 a	 solution	 to	 improve	 the	
current	standard‐setting	process.		
These	more	 principles‐based,	 or	 objective‐oriented	 standards,	 should	 have	
the	following	characteristics:	established	from	an	improved	conceptual	framework,	
have	 a	 clearly	 articulated	 objective,	 provide	 enough	 detail	 and	 structure	 to	 be	
applied	consistently,	have	minimal	exceptions,	and	avoid	the	use	of	bright‐lines,	or	
percentage	tests,	that	give	preparers	the	ability	to	structure	transactions	to	achieve	
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technical	 compliance	 while	 evading	 intent	 (SEC,	 2003).	 The	 exact	 methods	 of	
implementation	the	SEC	suggested	will	be	discussed	at	greater	length	below,	but	the	
underlying	message	was	holding	managers	and	auditors	accountable	 for	reporting	
the	substance	of	transactions.	As	a	result,	financial	reports	would	be	seen	as	an	act	of	
communication	 rather	 than	merely	 an	 act	 of	 compliance.	 The	 SEC	 concluded	 that	
though	 the	 costs	 of	 this	 transition	would	 likely	 be	 high	 and	 the	magnitude	 of	 the	
benefits	 difficult	 to	 quantify,	 “the	 benefits	 of	 adopting	 objectives‐
oriented…standards	 in	 the	US	 justify	 the	costs”	 (SEC,	2003).	Though	 the	FASB	has	
voiced	 continued	 support	 of	 adoption,	 little	 headway	has	 actually	 been	made.	 For	
example,	after	placing	leasing	accounting	reform	on	their	agendas	in	2006,	the	FASB	
and	 IASB	 began	 working	 jointly	 in	 2009.	 On	 May	 16,	 2013,	 the	 FASB	 issued	 a	
revision	to	the	2010	proposed	Accounting	Standard	Update,	Leases.	The	FASB	and	
IASB	are	currently	considering	all	feedback	and	re‐deliberating	the	significant	issues	
raised,	hoping	to	issue	another	exposure	draft	during	the	first	quarter	2014.	Though	
they	 are	 close	 to	 reaching	 a	 consensus,	 the	 FASB	 and	 IASB	 have	 yet	 to	 issue	 an	
update	to	leasing	standards	after	eight	years.	Nobes	(2005)	attributes	this	inability	
produce	an	update	 to	 the	FASBs	proclivity	 for	arbitrary	rules	and	 IASBs	proclivity	
for	vagueness.	The	report	suggested	a	redefinition	of	the	conceptual	framework	as	a	
long‐term	 goal,	 but	 in	 order	 for	 these	 two	 standard‐setting	 bodies	 to	 produce	
anything	meaningful	 in	 a	 timely	manner,	 they	must	better	 align	 at	 the	 conceptual	
level.	 Though	 the	 SEC	 report	 did	 offer	 valuable	 insights	 and	 proposed	 interesting	
suggestions,	the	ideas	have	not	yet	materialized.		
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Regulatory	Arbitrage:	The	Issues	with	Rules‐Oriented	Standards	
	 	
The	 findings	 and	 subsequent	 suggestions	 presented	 in	 the	 SEC	 report	 are	
based	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 can	 be	 problematic,	 and	 that	
more	principles‐oriented	standards	may	offer	a	solution	to	those	problems.	One	of	
the	primary	driving	forces	behind	the	rules‐oriented	issue	is	regulatory	arbitrage.	In	
other	words,	 rules‐oriented	 standards	allow	 for	 the	dominance	of	 legal	 form	over	
economic	substance.	Eaton	(2005)	points	out	the	existence	of	a	“perception	among	
many	 US	 accountants	 that	 bright	 line	 rules	 invite	 deceptive	 accounting”	 (Eaton,	
2005,	 p.	 9).	 That	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 regulatory	 arbitrage	 is	 encouraged	 by	
accountants.	Rather,	the	potential	to	engineer	transactions	exists	and	is	more	likely	
to	occur	under	a	rules‐oriented	standard‐setting	regime.		
But	why	 is	 this	 transaction	 engineering	 such	 an	 issue?	 In	 the	discussion	of	
the	 conceptual	 framework	 and	 its	 connection	 to	 rules‐oriented	 standards,	
comparability	is	cited	as	one	of	the	most	crucial	features	of	these	types	of	standards.	
Further,	 relevance	 often	 suffers	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 comparability	 between	 firms	
and	consistency	over	time.	However,	when	regulatory	arbitrage	occurs,	it	can	result	
in	 ‘surface	 comparability’	 (Alexander	 and	 Jermakowicz,	 2006).	 Surface	
comparability	 arises	 when	 “the	 application	 of	 specific	 rules	 may	 require	
economically	 different	 situations	 to	 be	 accounted	 for	 identically”	 (Alexander	 and	
Jermakowicz,	 2006).	 Tessema	 (2012)	 defines	 this	 phenomenon	 as	 pseudo‐
comparability.	 In	 these	cases,	 rules	prevent	managers	 from	 faithfully	 representing	
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their	 financial	position,	 giving	 rise	 to	 the	necessity	 for	exceptions.	As	 transactions	
grown	increasingly	complex,	standard	setters	are	often	faced	with	a	decision	to	add	
exceptions	 and	 guidance,	 which	 may	 further	 increase	 complexity,	 or	 leave	 the	
standard	as	is,	which	can	restrict	managers	from	faithfully	representing	their	firms.		
	 Another,	more	dangerous,	 type	of	surface	comparability	appears	as	a	result	
of	real	earnings	management,	or	“a	change	in	the	structure	of	transactions	or	events	
in	order	to	avoid	the	consequences	specified	by	an	accounting	standard”	(Tessema,	
2012).	Financial	statements	are	intended	to	reflect	the	economic	reality	of	the	firms	
they	 represent.	They	 should	 reflect	 if	 firms	have	highly	 cyclical	 income	or	 if	 firms	
own	 or	 lease	 their	 assets.	 Tessema	 argues	 tighter,	 rules‐oriented	 accounting	
standards	 do	 increase	 real	 earnings	 management.	 With	 leases,	 for	 example,	
managers	 often	 construct	 lease	 contracts	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 terms	 fall	 just	
within	the	bright‐line	thresholds	set	forth	by	the	standard.	As	a	result,	firms	are	able	
to	 materially	 change	 the	 presentation	 of	 their	 financial	 statements.	 Benston,	
Bromwich,	and	Wagenhofer	(2006)	attributed	a	 large	part	of	 the	Enron	scandal	 to	
this	 phenomenon.	 Though	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 are	 based	 off	 the	 conceptual	
framework,	 they	 foster	 an	 environment	 of	 compliance:	 “Enron	 could	 claim	 and	
Anderson	 concurred	 that	 calling	 the	 simultaneous	 purchase	 of	 two	 very	 different	
assets	was	 a	 ‘business’	 because	 there	was	no	 rule	 to	 say	 that	 it	wasn’t”	 (Benston,	
Bromwich,	and	Wagenhofer,	2006,	p.	177).	However,	 the	rules	 themselves	are	not	
the	only	things	to	blame.	Yes,	US	GAAP	did	technically	permit	Enron	to	act	as	they	
did,	but	the	individuals	at	Enron	actively	chose	to	take	advantage	of	these	loopholes.	
In	 times	of	crisis,	 there	 is	a	propensity	 to	point	 fingers	at	 the	accounting	 industry	
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and	 the	 accounting	 standards,	 but	 lack	 of	 integrity	 by	 management	 is	 an	 often	
overlooked	 driver	 in	 many	 cases.	 As	 standards	 continue	 to	 include	 a	 growing	
number	of	rules	and	exceptions,	it	becomes	more	and	more	conceivable	that	these	
rules	 could	 contradict	 principles,	 but	 there	 must	 also	 be	 individuals	 to	 take	
advantage	of	these	contradictions.	
	 In	summary,	 the	potential	 for	contradictions	to	exist	causes	uneasiness	and	
lack	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 more	 rules‐oriented	 US	 GAAP	 (Bailey	 and	 Sawers,	 2012).	
Managers	may	be	incentivized	to	structure	transactions	around	the	rules,	leading	to	
potential	 manipulation	 of	 financial	 information.	 In	 turn,	 investors	 may	 be	
sufficiently	 incentivized	 to	more	 thoroughly	 examine	 financial	 reporting	decisions	
by	management	(Miller	and	Bahnson,	2002).	This	lack	of	trust	in	financial	reporting	
does	not	serve	 the	 investing	public	and	causes	unnecessary	uncertainty.	 Investors	
are	 left	 to	 wonder	 whether	 relevant	 facts	 have	 been	misreported	 or	 unreported.	
This	can	lead	to	an	overall	higher	cost	of	capital20,	retarding	economic	growth	and	
inhibiting	stability	(Miller	and	Bahnson,	2002).	
	
Principles‐Oriented	Standards:	A	potential	solution?	
	 	
Though	there	were	likely	many	driving	forces,	the	US	accounting	scandals	of	
2001‐2002	 provided	 a	 spark	 that	 energized	 the	 conversation	 about	 a	 more	
principles‐oriented	 US	 GAAP.	 As	 Sawabe	 (2005)	 suggested,	 “The	 principles‐based	
                                                            
20	From	an	investor’s	perspective,	cost	of	capital	refers	to	the	accepted	level	of	return	required	by	
shareholders	to	invest.	
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approach	 to	 standard	 setting	 was	 a	 conscious	 strategy	 to	 counter	 creative	
accounting”	(Sawabe,	2005).	As	a	growing	number	of	rules	were	 issued,	managers	
responded	by	continually	redesigning	their	creative	accounting	instruments.	As	new	
loopholes	 were	 discovered,	 new	 rules	 would	 be	 issued,	 further	 complicating	 the	
standard	 implementation	 process.	 With	 the	 following	 quote,	 explains	 why	 firms,	
auditors,	and	regulators	desire	rules:	
“Companies	 want	 detailed	 guidance	 because	 those	 details	 eliminate	
uncertainties	 about	 how	 transactions	 should	 be	 structured.	 Auditors	 want	
specificity	because	 those	specific	requirements	 limit	 the	number	of	difficult	
disputes	 with	 clients	 and	 may	 provide	 a	 defense	 in	 litigation.	 Securities	
regulators	want	 detailed	 guidance	 because	 those	 details	 are	 thought	 to	 be	
easier	to	enforce”	(Sawabe,	2005).	
As	you	may	recall,	the	primary	objective	of	the	conceptual	framework	is	to	provide	
decision	useful	information	to	financial	statement	users.	Though	Sawabe	highlights	
valid	concerns	held	by	the	three	groups,	he	fails	to	acknowledge	the	most	important	
group,	 investors.	 Standard	 implementation	 has	 somewhat	 become	 an	 act	 of	
compliance	rather	 than	an	act	of	communication,	and	 investors	have	suffered	as	a	
result	(SEC,	2003).		
Some	managers	are	currently	taking	advantage	of	the	loopholes	in	US	GAAP,	
and	their	auditors	are	permitting	these	actions	because	they	are	technically	within	
the	limits	of	the	standards.	This	is	as	much	an	issue	of	integrity	as	it	is	an	issue	with	
the	set	of	 standards.	Managers	are	making	 the	choice	 to	exploit	 the	gaps	 in	GAAP,	
and	 auditors	 are	 allowing	 it	 to	 happen.	 It	 seems	 that	 a	 more	 principles‐oriented	
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GAAP	would	give	managers	the	ability	to	distort	economic	reality	even	further,	but	
as	many	 have	 suggested,	 this	 shift	 could	 alternatively	 realign	manager	 incentives.	
Currently,	 managers	 are	 practically	 encouraged	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 accounting	
loopholes	 because	 there	 are	 between	 little	 and	 no	 consequences.	 They	 get	 away	
with	things	like	off‐balance	sheet	financing	every	year,	and	GAAP	helps	justify	these	
actions.	With	a	more	principles‐oriented	set	of	standards,	managers	would	have	to	
justify	their	accounting	treatments	based	on	economic	reality,	no	longer	able	to	hide	
behind	 rules	 and	 exceptions.	 This	 does	 not	 necessarily	 address	 issues	 of	
professional	integrity,	but	it	could	realign	management	and	auditor	incentives.	Over	
time,	 managers	 might	 rethink	 their	 implementation	 of	 US	 GAAP	 as	 an	 act	 of	
communication	rather	than	an	act	of	compliance.			
	 Though	she	acknowledges	the	merits	of	more	principles‐oriented	standards,	
Schipper	 (2003)	 ultimately	 rejects	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘principles‐only’	 standards,	 citing	
the	 resulting	 potential	 reduction	 in	 comparability,	 consistency,	 and	 regulatory	
enforcement	 as	 her	 primary	 reasoning.	 Similarly,	 the	 FASB	 issued	 a	 Proposal	 in	
October	2002:	Principles‐Based	Approach	to	US	Standard	Setting	(MacDonald,	2002).	
MacDonald	 explained	 that	much	 of	 the	 complexity	 and	 detail	 found	 in	 accounting	
standards	had	been	demand‐driven.	She	claimed	that	much	of	the	detailed	guidance	
was	 introduced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 requests	 from	 managers	 and	 auditors.	 Likewise,	
MacDonald	 concluded	 the	 FASB	 Proposal	 by	 rejecting	 ‘principles‐only’	 standards.	
She	feared	that	standards	without	detailed	rules	“could	lead	to	situations	in	which	
professional	 judgments,	made	 in	 good	 faith,	 result	 in	 different	 interpretations	 for	
similar	 transactions	or	 events,	 raising	 concerns	 about	 comparability”	 (MacDonald,	
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2002).	Though	this	is	a	valid	concern,	as	discussed	above,	surface	comparability	can	
often	 be	 the	 result	 of	 rules.	 As	 Alexander	 and	 Jermakowicz	 (2006)	 reminded,	
managers	 likely	 have	 the	 deepest	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 of	 their	 firm’s	
economic	 reality	 and,	 thus,	 how	 it	 should	 be	 accounted	 for.	 However,	 managers	
sometimes	 ignore	 economic	 reality	 and	 choose	 the	 most	 beneficial	 accounting	
treatment	 because	 they	 are	 protected	 by	 bright‐line	 rules.	 Principles‐oriented	
standards	could	actually	curtail	this	behavior	because	managers	would	be	required	
to	provide	their	rationale	for	given	treatments	to	their	auditors,	and	their	auditors	
would	have	to	assess	these	explanations	on	their	value	rather	than	their	adherence	
to	a	rule.	Especially	in	the	post‐Enron	world,	auditors	are	even	more	incentivized	to	
prevent	fraud	and	avoid	the	fate	of	Arthur	Anderson	at	all	cost.	
Detailed	 rules	 can	 often	 stifle	 a	 standards	 ability	 to	 allow	 for	 faithful	
representation,	 discrediting	 professional	 judgment.	 Perhaps	 worse,	 though,	 the	
existence	of	detailed	rules	can	provide	a	roadmap	for	‘economic	discretion’	(Sawabe,	
2005).	 Rules‐orientated	 standards	 are	 intended	 to	 curtail	 accounting	 discretions.	
Accounting	 discretion	 refers	 “to	 those	 [discretions]	 relating	 to	 accounting	
treatments	 of	 recognition	 and	 measurement”	 (Sawabe,	 2005).	 Though	 these	
treatments	can	have	a	potential	material	impact	on	the	financial	statements,	they	do	
not	affect	the	economic	substance	of	the	firm.	That	is,	cash	inflows	and	outflows	are	
not	altered	by	accounting	discretion.	Economic	discretion,	alternatively,	can	have	an	
impact	 on	 the	 economic	 substance	 of	 the	 firm.	 Sawabe	 argues	 that	 “Economic	
discretions	are	usually	more	costly	than	accounting	discretions	because	they	affect	
cash	 flows	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 accounting	 numbers”	 (Sawabe,	 2005).	 Though	 detailed	
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rules	 can	 prevent	 numerous	 accounting	 treatments	 of	 similar	 transactions	 and	
events,	 they	also	provide	a	 safe	harbor	 for	managers	and	auditors	 to	hide	behind.	
Managers	are	protected	by	adhering	to	the	precise	guidelines	provided	in	US	GAAP.	
In	addition,	auditors	are	less	inclined	to	question	their	clients’	accounting	numbers	
because	 they	met	 each	 line‐item	on	 a,	 sometimes	 arbitrary,	 checklist.	 This	 can	 be	
especially	harmful	and	costly	because	questionable	transactions	are	often	accepted	
when	they	fall	within	the	detailed	guidelines	of	certain	standards.	Investors,	in	turn,	
are	potentially	given	a	false	sense	of	confidence	in	the	reliability	and	comparability	
of	financial	statements.		
	 With	 a	 move	 away	 from	 more	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 back	 to	 their	
principle‐oriented	 roots,	 many	 have	 suggested	 that	 more	 relevant	 and	 reliable	
information	 would	 result	 (Miller	 and	 Bahnson,	 2002;	 Nobes,	 2005;	 Agoglia,	
Doupnik,	 and	 Tsakumis,	 2011).	 Though	managers	 and	 auditors	 prefer	 rules,	 “the	
less	precise	the	standard,	the	more	concerned	preparers	are	about	second‐guessing	
and	 possible	 costs	 imposed	 through	 regulation	 and	 litigation”	 (Agoglia,	 Doupnik,	
and	 Tsakumis,	 2011,	 p.	 749).	 With	 less	 detailed	 guidance,	 managers	 are	 highly	
incentivized	 to	 represent	 the	 underlying	 economics	 of	 their	 firm	 as	 accurately	 as	
possible.	One	thing	to	consider,	though,	is	managers’	compensation	is	usually	tied,	in	
some	capacity,	to	firm	performance.	Managers	may	have	stock	options	that	are	tied	
to	the	stock	price	or	bonuses	dependent	on	earnings	per	share	targets,	so	there	may	
be	an	incentive	to	inflate	the	firm’s	earnings.	In	a	2013	study,	Ali	and	Zhang	looked	
at	the	relationship	between	CEO	tenure	and	earnings	management.	They	found	that	
CEOs	 are	 generally	 highly	 incentivized	 to	 avoid	 misstating	 earnings	 in	 order	 to	
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prevent	loss	of	reputation	(Ali	and	Zhang,	2013).	Experience	has	shown	that	this	is	
not	 true	 of	 all	 managers,	 especially	 those	 in	 their	 first	 or	 final	 years,	 but	 a	more	
principles‐oriented	US	GAAP	could	incentivize	managers	to	faithfully	represent	their	
firms.	 If	managers	make	 a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 fairly	 portray	 economic	 reality	 and	
they	have	sufficient	evidence	to	support	their	choices,	“then	they	will	be	better	able	
to	defend	themselves	when	second‐guessed	by	external	parties”	(Agoglia,	Doupnik,	
and	 Tsakumis,	 2011,	 p.	 752).	 The	 result	 of	 this	 more	 principles‐oriented	 world	
should	be	better	information	for	financial	statement	users.	If	managers	and	auditors	
are	wary	of	potential	 litigation	and	reputation	 loss,	 they	should	be	 incentivized	 to	
represent	their	firms	faithfully,	and	have	strong	evidence	to	support	why	they	chose	
a	particular	accounting	treatment.	Earnings	management	exists	 in	part	because	US	
GAAP	 permits	 it	 and	 in	 part	 because	 managers	 are	 opportunistic.	 A	 potential	
solution	is	to	alter	US	GAAP,	removing	the	rules	and	exceptions	that	allow	managers	
to	point	at	the	standards	for	protection.	There	will	still	be	opportunistic	managers,	
but	they	will	lack	the	bright‐line	rules	to	hide	behind.		
	 When	a	regulatory	body	takes	down	stop	 lights	and	road	blocks	(or	bright‐
lines),	the	assumption	is	that	chaos	will	necessarily	ensue.	Perhaps	this	example	can	
shine	 some	 light	 onto	 the	 debate.	 Public	 officials	 in	 London	 were	 experiencing	 a	
crisis.	Faced	with	a	growing	population,	one	of	the	busiest	intersections	in	the	city	
was	getting	busier.	The	intersection	had	essentially	halted	to	a	stop,	creating	traffic	
for	miles	in	all	directions.	They	brought	in	civil	engineers	from	across	the	world,	and	
no	 one	 could	 seem	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 congestion.	 The	 tinkered	 with	 the	
duration	of	wait	 times,	 the	number	of	stop	 lights,	and	they	even	tried	 instituting	a	
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fee	 to	 use	 the	 road,	 but	 nothing	 worked.	 Eventually,	 one	 individual	 proposed	 a	
seemingly	 insane	solution:	simply	remove	all	of	 the	stop	 lights	and	signs.	The	idea	
was	shot	down	initially	by	many,	objecting	that	no	one	would	ever	stop.	However,	
the	 idea	 was	 eventually	 approved,	 and	 within	 months,	 the	 traffic	 had	 not	 only	
improved,	 but	 was	 practically	 free	 flowing.	 Though	 there	 were	 obviously	 many	
forces	at	work	here,	one	of	the	most	important	was	that	of	 incentives.	At	the	most	
basic	 level,	 drivers	 were	 incentivized	 not	 to	 crash	 into	 each	 other.	 They	 quickly	
learned	how	 to	not	 only	 avoid	 collisions,	 but	 also	how	 to	 communicate	 and	move	
freely	amongst	one	another.		
	 There	 is	 no	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 removing	 all	 rules	 from	 accounting	
standards	would	 lead	to	a	similar	outcome	as	the	one	above,	and	that	claim	is	not	
being	made.	Rather,	the	example	provides	an	interesting	insight	 into	the	economic	
concept	 of	 incentives.	 People,	 and	 firms,	 tend	 to	 act	 in	 their	 own	 self‐interest.	 A	
sometimes	overlooked	aspect	of	the	‘principles‐rules’	debate	is	that	there	are	costs,	
in	 fact	 very	 large	 ones,	 related	 to	 managers	 reporting	 fraudulent	 accounting	
numbers	and	auditors	approving	 those	numbers.	Lawsuits	 and,	more	 importantly,	
reputations	 are	 at	 stake.	 Similar	 to	 the	 stoplight	 example,	 Christopher	 Nobes,	 a	
Professor	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Reading,	 England,	 proposed	 a	 solution	 to	 improve	
standard	 clarity:	 a	 reduction	 in	 rules.	His	 study	was	 based	 on	 the	notion	 that	 the	
“use	 of	 a	 more	 appropriate	 principle	 would	 reduce	 the	 need	 for	 arbitrary	 and	
detailed	rules”	(Nobes,	2005,	p.	32).	Rather	than	increasing	guidance	to	account	for	
the	ever	evolving	business	world,	he	suggested	retooling	standards	to	more	closely	
reflect	principles	from	the	conceptual	framework.	The	argument	is	that	the	need	for	
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guidance	develops,	 in	part,	 from	demand	by	managers	and	auditors,	but	also	 from	
‘rouge	 principles’	 (Nobes,	 2005)	 that	 may	 not	 align	 directly	 with	 the	 conceptual	
framework.	He	provides	numerous	examples	that	could	improve	from	a	reduction	in	
rules	 including:	 lease	 accounting,	 financial	 assets,	 subsidiaries,	 and	 equity	
accounting.	These	examples	tangibly	highlight	some	of	the	problems	associated	with	
more	 rules‐oriented	 standards,	 and	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 shortly.	 The	
bottom	 line	 is	 that	 a	 reduction	 in	 rules	 can	 be	 associated	with	 “increased	 clarity,	
decreased	complexity,	and	decreased	motivation	for	the	structuring	of	transactions”	
(Nobes,	2005,	p.	27),	placing	a	greater	emphasis	on	economic	substance	than	legal	
form.		
Example:	Lease	Accounting	–	Form	over	substance?	
	 Though	there	are	countless	examples	of	rules‐oriented	standards	that	fail	to	
accomplish	 their	 goal	 of	 faithful	 representation,	 none	 is	 more	 visibly	 guilty	 than	
accounting	for	leases.	According	to	a	study	published	by	the	Equipment	Leasing	and	
Finance	 Foundation21,	 the	 global	 equipment	 finance	 market	 returned	 pre‐Great	
Recession	levels	by	2012,	an	estimated	$725	billion	business.	Many	different	types	
of	 equipment	 are	 being	 leased,	 from	 helicopters	 to	 bulldozers	 to	 computers	 to	
airliners.	 The	 players	 involved	 in	 these	 transactions	 are	 lessees	 and	 lessors.	 The	
lessee	negotiates	 the	 right	 to	use	specific	property	 for	a	specified	amount	of	 time,	
while	 the	 lessor	 owns	 the	 property	 in	 question.	 In	 return	 for	 the	 use,	 the	 lessee	
makes	rental	payments	to	the	lessor	over	the	agreed	upon	time	of	the	lease.	Though	
                                                            
21	The	Equipment	Leasing	and	Finance	Foundation	is	an	independent,	not‐for‐profit	foundation	that	
studies	markets,	trends,	and	operations	relating	to	the	equipment	finance	industry.	
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this	 may	 seem	 relatively	 straight	 forward,	 US	 GAAP	 allows	 for	 two	 different	
categorizations:	 capital	 leases	 and	operating	 leases.	 An	operating	 lease	 allows	 the	
manager	 to	 record	 the	 expense	 related	 to	 rent	 immediately	 on	 the	 firm’s	 income	
statement.	A	capital	lease,	conversely,	requires	that	managers	capitalize	equipment	
and	 record	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	 total	 lease	 payments	 on	 their	 balance	 sheet.	
Most	managers	prefer	operating	leases	because	they	do	not	have	to	record	an	asset	
on	 their	 books,	 or	 the	 corresponding	 liability.	 The	 incurrence	 of	 this	 additional	
liability	 affects	 certain	 financial	 ratios	 and	 income	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 lease,	
among	other	things.	Though	managers	would	almost	always	prefer	operating	leases,	
the	FASB	recognizes	that	some	transaction	should	be	capitalized,	so	they	developed	
a	set	of	criteria	to	determine	proper	accounting	treatment.	
	 The	FASB	developed	four	criteria	for	establishing	whether	a	lease	should	be	
capitalized	 or	 expensed	 immediately.	 The	 criteria	 are	 as	 follows:	 the	 transfer	 of	
ownership	 test,	 the	 bargain‐purchase	 option	 test,	 the	 economic	 life	 test,	 and	 the	
recovery	 of	 investment	 test	 (Miller	 and	 Bahnson,	 2002).	 The	 first	 criterion,	 the	
transfer	of	ownership	test,	 is	straight	 forward	and	relatively	easy	 to	apply.	Simply	
put,	 if	 ownership	 transfers	 at	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 lease,	 then	 the	 lease	must	 be	
capitalized.	The	next	three	criteria,	however,	are	not	so	easy	to	test	and	have	created	
numerous	 controversies.	 The	 second	 criterion,	 the	 bargain‐purchase	 option	 test,	
allows	 the	 lessee	 to	 purchase	 the	 asset	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	 lease	 at	 a	 ‘bargain’.	 This	
bargain	 price	 is	 determined	 by	 estimating	 the	 future	 fair	 value	 of	 the	 asset,	 and	
setting	 the	purchase	price	at	a	point	well	below	that	estimate.	The	 third	criterion,	
the	economic	life	test,	asserts	that	if	the	term	of	the	lease	is	longer	than	seventy‐five	
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percent	of	the	useful	life	of	the	asset,	then	the	asset	must	be	capitalized.	Not	only	can	
useful	 life	be	difficult	 to	determine,	managers	also	have	 the	ability	 to	contrast	 the	
lease	 term	 to	 last	 just	 under	 seventy‐five	 percent	 of	 the	 useful	 life.	 The	 final	
criterion,	 the	 recovery	 of	 investment	 test,	 states	 that	 if	 the	 present	 value	 of	 the	
minimum	 lease	 payments22	 equals	 or	 exceeds	 ninety	 percent	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	
asset,	then	the	asset	must	be	capitalized.		
	 As	 you	 have	 likely	 realized,	 lease	 accounting	 is	 subject	 to	 abuse.	 One	 can	
imagine	that	managers	make	concerted	efforts	to	circumvent	the	intent	of	US	GAAP	
and	expense	whenever	possible.	One	could	argue	that	there	are	certain	leases	that	
should	be	accounted	for	using	the	operating	method,	but	almost	all	leases	should	be	
capitalized.	 Benefits	 to	 expensing	 rather	 than	 capitalizing	 include:	 materially	
reducing	 liabilities	 that	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 financial	 statements	 and	
smoothing	 of	 expenses23.	 An	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 the	 rules‐oriented	 lease	
accounting	standard	is	the	propensity	for	firms	to	“beat	the	lease	standard”	(Dieter,	
1979).	 Managers	 can	 relatively	 easily	 achieve	 their	 goal	 of	 avoiding	 lease	
capitalization	 by	 creative	 design,	 writing,	 and	 interpretation	 of	 lease	 agreements.	
Though	 it	 may	 be	 intuitive,	 some	 of	 the	 most	 common	 ways	 in	 which	 managers	
avoid	capitalization	are	as	follows:	(1)	ensure	that	there	is	no	specified	transfer	of	
title,	(2)	exclude	a	bargain‐purchase	option,	(3)	set	the	lease	term	to	some	duration	
                                                            
22	Three	important	concepts	contribute	to	determining	the	present	value	of	minimum	lease	
payments:	total	minimum	lease	payments,	executory	costs,	and	discount	rate.	Minimum	lease	
payments	include	the	minimum	payments	the	lessee	has	agreed	to	pay	to	the	lessor	(including,	but	
not	limited	to,	all	rental	payments).	Executory	costs	refer	to	things	such	as	insurance,	maintenance,	
and	tax	expenses.	Once	these	previous	two	amounts	are	summed,	they	are	discounted	to	present	
value	based	on	the	discount	rate,	or	the	rate	the	lessee	would	have	incurred	to	borrow	the	funds	
necessary	to	buy	the	leased	asset	(Ely,	1995).	
23	Smoothing	is	a	concept	that	will	be	more	fully	explored	in	the	next	section.	
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less	than	seventy‐five	percent	of	the	useful	life,	and	(4)	arrange	for	the	present	value	
of	 the	minimum	 lease	payments	 to	be	 less	 than	ninety	percent	of	 the	value	of	 the	
asset	(Kieso,	Weygandt,	and	Warfield,	2012).		
	 Though	many	have	recommended	reform	to	lease	accounting	(Dieter,	1979;	
Nobes,	 2005;	 Agoglia,	 Doupnik,	 and	 Tsakumis,	 2011),	 little	 has	 come	 of	 these	
recommendations.	 As	 Nobes	 (2005)	 suggested,	 political	 unpopularity	 may	 be	 the	
biggest	 obstacle	 to	 reform.	 Leasing	 standards	 predate	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 what	
constitutes	 a	 liability.	 Issued	 in	 December	 1985,	 the	 FASB	 defined	 liabilities	 in	
Concept	Statement	No.	6	as	“probable	future	sacrifices	of	economic	benefits	arising	
from	obligations	of	a	particular	entity	to	transfer	assets…to	other	entities”.	In	other	
words,	a	liability	arises	when	one	firm	is	contractually	obligated	to	pay	another	firm	
in	 exchange	 for	 a	 service	 or	 product.	 Nobes	 (2005)	 believes	 that	 much	 of	 the	
arbitrary	 detail	 found	 in	 GAAP	 can	 be	 remedied	 by	 applying	 a	more	 appropriate	
principle.	 Rather	 than	 adjusting	 the	 current	 rules,	 exceptions,	 and	 guidance,	 he	
believes	standard	setters	should	place	a	greater	focus	on	reflecting	the	substance	of	
the	standard	from	the	start.	As	such,	“obligation	under	all	noncancelable	leases	meet	
the	 definition	 of	 ‘liability’	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	 [capitalized]”	 (Nobes,	 2005,	 p.	
28).	 As	 referenced	 above,	 lease	 accounting	 standards	were	 introduced	 in	 January	
1977,	a	 full	 eight	years	before	 liabilities	were	 concretely	 conceptualized.	Thinking	
about	 these	 noncancelable	 leases	 as	 liabilities	 would,	 in	 part,	 solve	 the	 problems	
associated	 with	 over‐expensing	 and	 under‐capitalizing	 leases.	 A	 more	 principles‐
oriented	 approach	 to	 lease	 accounting	 “would	 not	 lead	 to	 imprecision,	 lack	 of	
verifiability,	or	 lack	of	comparability.	All	noncancelable	 leases	would	be	 treated	 in	
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the	same	way”	(Nobes,	2005,	p.	28).	Furthermore,	Agoglia,	Doupnik,	and	Tsakumis	
(2011)	 found	 that	 financial	 statement	 preparers	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 report	
aggressively	when	 applying	 a	 less	 precise	 criterion.	 This	 is	 just	 one	 example	 that	
displays	a	possible	benefit	to	a	reduction	in	rules‐oriented	standards.	Though	lease	
accounting	reform	has	been	on	 the	docket	since	2006,	and	 the	FASB	and	 IFRS	are	
working	together	to	arrive	upon	a	better	accounting	standard,	the	FASB	has	yet	to	
issue	a	finalized	Accounting	Standard	Update.	A	third	Exposure	Draft	will	be	issued	
sometime	 during	 first	 quarter	 2014,	 but	 lease	 accounting	 will	 remain	 unchanged	
until	at	 least	then.	The	mere	fact	that	the	FASB	and	the	IASB	are	working	towards	
change	suggests	that	the	current	standards	are	in	need	of	improvement.	
	
Accounting	Standard	Orientation	and	Litigation	
	 	
Though	some	of	the	concepts	discussed	in	their	study24	have	been	alluded	to	
thus	 far,	 University	 of	 Texas	 professors	 Dain	 Donelson	 and	 John	 McInnis	 and	
University	of	 Iowa	professor	Richard	Mergenthaler	examine	 the	 competing	 claims	
that:	 (1)	rules‐oriented	standards	shield	 firms	 from	litigation	and	(2)	violations	of	
detailed	rules	give	plaintiffs	a	‘roadmap’	to	successful	litigation.	The	purpose	of	their	
study	was	to	“inform	this	debate	by	investigating	whether	rules‐based	standards	are	
associated	 with	 the	 incidence	 and	 outcome	 of	 securities	 class	 action	 litigation”	
(Donelson,	McInnis,	and	Mergenthaler,	2012,	p.	1247).	They	characterized	the	two	
                                                            
24	Rules‐Based	Accounting	Standards	and	Litigation	
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prevalent,	 competing	 theories	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 rules‐oriented	
standards	 and	 litigation:	 the	 ‘protection’	 theory	 and	 the	 ‘roadmap’	 theory.	 The	
protection	 theory	 asserts	 that	 rules‐oriented	 standards	 lead	 to	 lower	 incidents	 of	
lawsuits	 and	 decrease	 the	 likelihood	 of	 unfavorable	 suit	 outcomes.	 This	 theory	
contends	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 “the	 specificity	 of	 rules‐based	 standards	 provides	
plaintiffs	 with	 a	 clear	 path	 to	 successful	 litigation”	 (Donelson,	 McInnis,	 and	
Mergenthaler,	2012,	p.	1248).	The	protection	 theory	gives	defendants	 two	 lines	of	
defense.	First,	 if	 firms	do	not	admit	 to	an	accounting	misstatement,	 then	 it	 is	very	
difficult	for	plaintiffs	to	uncover	if	firms	have	violated	any	standards	and	are	guilty	
of	wrongdoing.	They	are	shielded	by	a	‘safe	harbor’,	protected	by	the	fact	that	there	
is	 not	 always	 access	 to	 transparent	 information.	 Second,	 if	 firms	 do	 admit	 an	
accounting	misstatement,	“Managers	violating	rules‐based	standards	can	argue	that	
[it]	 was	 an	 innocent	 mistake	 caused	 by	 the	 complexities	 of	 GAAP”	 (Donelson,	
McInnis,	 and	 Mergenthaler,	 2012,	 p.	 1248).	 In	 essence,	 firms	 can	 hide	 under	 the	
bright‐lines	of	accounting	rules,	or	they	can	admit	wrongdoing	and	then	blame	the	
highly	 detailed	 bright‐lines	 for	 making	 GAAP	 too	 complex,	 causing	 an	 innocent	
misstatement.	
	 The	 roadmap	 theory,	 conversely,	 asserts	 that	 rules‐oriented	 standards	
actually	 lead	 to	 higher	 incidents	 of	 lawsuits	 and	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	
unfavorable	suit	outcomes.	The	argument	behind	the	protection	theory	is	that	intent	
is	very	difficult	to	prove.	If	there	is	no	misstatement,	then	the	plaintiff	has	to	prove	
both	 that	 a	 transaction	 or	 event	 was	 accounted	 for	 incorrectly,	 and	 that	 the	
treatment	was	intentionally	malevolent.	The	roadmap	theory	argues	that	“the	detail	
50 
 
and	 objectivity	 of	 rules‐based	 standards	 help	 to	 establish	 intent,	 as	 plaintiffs	 can	
argue	 that	 it	 is	 implausible	 that	executives	would	unintentionally	violate	 the	clear	
guidance	provide	by	a	rules‐based	standard”	(Donelson,	McInnis,	and	Mergenthaler,	
2012,	p.	1254).		
	 To	 test	 the	 various	 relationships	 between	 standard	 type	 and	 litigation,	 the	
authors	 looked	 at	 lawsuits	 citing	 specific	 accounting	 standards	 from	 1996‐2005,	
many	 years	 before	 and	 after	 the	 Enron	 accounting	 scandal.	 Interestingly	 enough,	
they	found	that	neither	the	protection	theory	nor	the	roadmap	theory	held	true	in	
full.	Though	there	was	a	correlation	between	standard	type	and	litigation	incidence,	
the	 type	 of	 standard	 had	 no	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 on	 litigation	 outcomes	
(Donelson,	 McInnis,	 and	 Mergenthaler,	 2012).	 Regarding	 cases	 without	 a	
restatement,	they	concluded	that	plaintiffs	are	less	likely	to	allege	violations	of	more	
rules‐oriented	standards.	Regarding	cases	with	a	restatement,	incidence	of	litigation	
was	less	across	the	board,	suggesting	credence	towards	the	safe	harbor	assumption.	
In	 summary,	 the	authors	 stated	 that	 “the	protection	 theory	predicts	 that	plaintiffs	
will	tend	to	allege	standards	that	are	more	principles‐based	due	to	the	safe	harbor	
protection	 provided	 by	 rules‐based	 standards	when	 firms	 follow	 rules,	 as	 well	 as	
plaintiffs’	 ability	 to	 ‘second‐guess’	 accounting	 decisions	 under	 principles‐based	
standards”	 (Donelson,	 McInnis,	 and	 Mergenthaler,	 2012,	 p.	 1273).	 As	 such,	 they	
assert	 that	 a	 shift	 towards	 a	 more	 principles‐oriented	 set	 of	 standards	 would	
weaken	 the,	 currently	 strong,	 safe	 harbor	 protection,	 providing	 plaintiffs	 with	 “a	
wider	 menu	 of	 potential	 ‘judgment‐based’	 allegations	 in	 cases	 not	 involving	
admitted	restatements”	(Donelson,	McInnis,	and	Mergenthaler,	2012,	p.	1273).		
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Conclusion:	Are	filling	the	gaps	in	GAAP	possible?	
asdfasdfasdfasdfasdf	
Though	 there	 is	 still	 some	 debate	 about	 the	 value	 of	 adopting	 a	 more	
principles‐oriented	 US	 GAAP,	 the	 overwhelming	 sentiment	 in	 the	 academic	
community	is	that	the	United	States’	set	of	accounting	standards	have	swung	too	far	
towards	 the	 rules‐oriented	 side	 of	 the	 continuum.	 Though	 there	 are	 certainly	
transactions	 and	 events	 that	 require	 some	 level	 of	 guidance,	 the	 FASB,	 facing	
pressure	politically	and	from	industry,	has	created	a	highly	rules‐oriented	US	GAAP	
over	 time.	 There	 is	 currently	 a	 propensity	 towards	more	 and	more	 guidance	 and	
bright‐line	 rules.	 Among	 the	 primary	 justifications	 for	 this	 tendency	 is	 that	 rules‐
oriented	 standards	 lead	 to	 more	 comparability,	 which	 ultimately	 improves	 the	
quality	of	financial	information.	However,	as	discussed	above,	often	these	standards	
lead	 to	 nothing	 more	 than	 surface	 comparability.	 Surface	 comparability	 can	 be	
extremely	 problematic	 because	 it	 creates	 the	 perception	 that	 firm’s	 financial	
statements	 are	 comparable.	 In	 reality,	 though,	 firms	 are	 structuring	 transactions	
around	guidance	and	bright‐line	rules,	causing	them	to	alter	their	actual	operations,	
not	just	their	accounting	numbers.		
	 A	more	principles‐oriented	US	GAAP	would	give	managers	the	ability	to	more	
faithfully	 represent	 their	 firm’s	 economic	 reality.	 Allowing	 managers	 to	 prepare	
relevant,	 faithfully	 represented	 financial	 statements	 should	 lead	 to	more	 decision	
useful	 information.	However,	 there	 are	 numerous	 factors	 that	must	 be	 taken	 into	
account	when	 considering	 a	 transition	 away	 from	 rules‐oriented	 standards.	 First,	
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there	are	many	logistical	hurdles	that	need	to	be	jumped.	As	Samaila	(2012)	pointed	
out,	 any	 transition	 would	 likely	 be	 very	 highly	 capital	 intensive.	 Implementation	
challenges	 would	 range	 anywhere	 from	 staff	 training	 to	 US	 GAAP	 redesign	 or	
replacement	 to	 consultancy	 fees	 regarding	 proper	 reclassifications.	 In	 addition	 to	
restructuring	 costs,	 there	 would	 likely	 be	 increased	 legal	 fees.	 Though	 Donelson,	
McInnis,	and	Mergenthaler	(2012)	found	that	standard	type	does	not	affect	litigation	
outcomes,	 they	 did	 suggest	 that	 principles‐oriented	 standards	 do	 lead	 to	 higher	
incidences	of	litigation.	The	increased	number	of	lawsuits	could	tangibly	affect	firms	
financially,	 as	often	 times	 firms	 reach	 settlements	before	 suits	 ever	make	 it	 court.	
Another	 concern	 raised	 by	 Schipper	 (2003)	 revolved	 around	 the	 resources	 of	 the	
SEC.	 She	 did	 not	 believe	 the	 SEC	 had	 adequate	 resources	 to	 devote	 to	 answering	
registrant	 questions	 about	 acceptable	 interpretations	 or	 engage	 in	 detailed	
discussions	about	registrant	choices,	which	would	surely	increase	with	a	move	away	
from	rules‐oriented	standards.		
	 These	 challenges,	 though	difficult	 to	quantify	 financially,	 can	be	 reasonably	
estimated	 and	 accounted	 for	 from	 a	 cost‐benefit	 analysis	 standpoint.	 The	 larger	
challenge,	 then,	 revolves	 around	 the	 issue	 of	 integrity.	 As	 discussed	 in	 numerous	
sections,	 managers	 find	 creative	 ways	 to	 circumvent	 the	 current	 highly	 rules‐
oriented	 standards,	 and	 auditors	 do	 not	 always	 do	 enough	 to	 counteract	 this	
creativity.	Still,	it	would	be	imprudent	to	suggest	that	principles‐oriented	standards	
would	 prevent	 managers	 from	 participating	 in	 opportunistic	 behavior	 altogether.	
However,	 though	 this	 solution	 would	 require	 more	 auditor	 liability	 and	 is	 not	
necessarily	 a	 short‐term	 answer,	 Smith	 suggested	 that	 “Educators	 need	 to	
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increasingly	emphasize	two	values	that	have	long	been	the	mainstay	of	accountants’	
reputation:	 integrity	and	professional	skepticism”	(Smith,	2003,	p.	48).	Aggressive,	
unethical	 behavior	 by	 top	 management	 at	 Enron	 largely	 crippled	 the	 company’s	
ability	to	function	and	prosper,	and	ineffective	auditors	perpetuated	their	behavior.	
Managers	can	be	 incentivized	 to	act	 in	 the	 interest	of	 their	 firm	or	 their	own	self‐
interest.	 As	 such,	 ethics	 in	 accounting	 are	 essential	 to	 producing	 financial	
statements	 that	 encourage	 public	 confidence.	 Neither	 rules	 nor	 principles	 can	
completely	 preclude	 malevolent	 mangers	 from	 reporting	 fraudulently,	 but	 the	
interplay	 between	 managers	 and	 auditors	 can	 lead	 to	 more	 decision	 useful	
information.		
With	 bight‐line	 rules	 and	 guidance	 lifted	 and	 a	 move	 back	 towards	 the	
principles	 of	 a	 standard,	 managers	 can	 attempt	 to	 present	 the	 most	 relevant	
information	 possible.	 Though	 managers	 best	 know	 about	 the	 transactions	 and	
events	 of	 their	 firm,	 they	 are	 also	 optimistic	 about	 their	 firm’s	 future.	 It	 is	 here	
where	auditors,	bound	by	a	strong	code	of	professional	ethics	and	skepticism,	must	
hold	managers	accountable.	Rather	than	relying	on	a	detailed	set	of	rules,	managers	
and	auditors	should	be	allowed	to	arrive	upon	faithfully	represented	numbers.	In	a	
rules‐oriented	world,	managers	 are	 able	 to	hide	behind	bright‐lines	 in	 accounting	
standards,	and	auditors	are	not	 incentivized	enough	to	challenge	their	clients	who	
are	technically	in	compliance.		In	a	principles‐oriented	world,	conversely,	managers’	
optimism	 and	 auditors’	 conservatism	 are	 allowed	 to	 interact	 and	 produce	 more	
relevant,	and	hopefully,	more	reliable	information.	Stripped	of	the	ability	to	point	to	
mere	 compliance	 with	 a	 rules‐oriented	 standard,	 managers	 would	 need	 sound	
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reasoning	for	a	certain	accounting	treatment,	and	auditors	would	be	responsible	for	
approving	that	reasoning.		
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